There are few things more elusive in the world than equality. It is of course true from a biological standpoint that human beings are the same across phenotypical differences. That is, the very idea of race is a myth, as Ashley Montague argued masterfully long before it was fashionable to advances such a view. But what intrigues me is that human beings seem to have an extremely hard time treating one another as moral and social equals. A brief romp through the history of humankind shows nothing at all if it does not reveal case after case after case of entrenched practices of moral and social inequality both across groups that differ sharply with respect to phenotype and between individuals who by and large share the same phenotype.
If equality across the board comes natural to people, there is little evidence of this. For when I think of things that come naturally to human beings, I think of things that people are disposed to do in the complete absence of incentives (either external punishment or rewards). People are disposed to eat or to seek out loves or to obtain sexual relief. Ne’er a law is needed to get people to do these things. If these things constitute our model of a natural disposition, then equality is not that at all. When it comes to acceptance across phenotypical differences, other species are much, much better at this. Dogs, for instance, are utterly indifferent to one another’s physical appearances. Thus, dogs with spots are not segregated against by dogs without spots nor do dogs with spots hold themselves to be superior to dogs without spots. It won’t do to intone that spots have nothing to do with whether a creature is a dog or not; for that is precisely the point. It is equally true that phenotypical differences among human beings do not mark a difference in levels of humanity. All human beings are equally that.
Some people talk as if slavery with regard to blacks was an American invention or, if not that, an invention of whites. But nothing of the sort is true. Aristotle thought it natural that there should be slaves; and he was not at all thinking about blacks. And while Muslim Arabs often give the impression that blacks and Arabs are brothers, the truth is that Muslim Arabs trafficked mightily in black slavery long before whites did. The book Slavery in the Islamic Middle East *([1999] edited by Shaun Marmon) is an excellent collection of essays regarding slavery in the Islamic world. The vast Sahara Desert stretches across the width of continent of Africa; and the differences between individuals above and below the Sahara Desert was not seen as trivial by those located in one place or the other. Then there is the truth that blacks tribes often enslaved other blacks. It may now be politically correct to hold that all blacks constitute a single people; however, a careful look at the very long history of blacks in Africa makes it clear that blacks had no difficulty distinguishing among themselves. Blackness does not a people make, any more than whiteness does.
It is also true that capitalism cannot be blamed for inequality—even inequality in the form of slavery. The Islamic Ottoman Empire was not a capitalistic one, though it trafficked mightily in slavery. So the question that cries out for an answer is simply this: What is it about human beings that makes equality across all groups so profoundly elusive?
Paradoxically, diversity may be the problem. Diversity, of course, is the idea that all groups are equally good. So far; so good. But what everyone ignores is the simple truth that there is a fundamental difference between
(a) All groups are equally good
and
(b ) Each person is accepted by all groups
The truth of (a) simply does not entail the truth of (b). Not only that, if we push diversity too hard, then the very possibility of (b) becomes increasingly untenable. That is, the harder the lines of diversity get drawn, then the more difficult it becomes to have acceptance across groups.
The explanation for this is that diversity bespeaks profoundly different values at the level of social interaction. I may know all too well that you are a human being, but not want to have anything to do with you because I know that you and I do not share the same values. In fact, I may hate you because of the values you hold. So our belief in equal rights for human beings may not get us very far when it comes to genuine personal warmth between us.
Animals do not have this problem; for they do not possess values. We do not talk about animals being culturally German or Canadian or English. Only as a joke, would we talk about a cat, say, being culturally alienated because its family moved from Egypt to Germany, or the other way around. But a human being can detest that move. And those in her or his new country may unwittingly make it very clear that the individual is not one of them—that the person lacks the requisite sensibilities. Yet ne’er a right is violated. And this kind of social distance is the basis for enmity between individuals. And in the face of enmity, equality recedes into the background. I may not kill you but that you were killed does not bother me as much as it would if one of my own had been killed in the same manner by those people.
If these remarks point in the right direction, then diversity and equality are not the bedfellows that people often make them out to be. Fanning the flames of diversity, far from extinguishing bigotry, may very well give bigotry its raison d’être.
