It is not uncommon for the name of Hitler to surface as an example of a courageous person. The rationale given usually goes like this: He stood up for what he believed in and, moreover, he did so at considerable risk to himself. By this line of reasoning, the KKK, the Nation of Islam, and neo-Nazis turn out to be courageous. And that, needless to say, should give everyone pause, including the members of the groups just named. The very idea that neo-Nazis, the KKK and the Nation of Islam might all be equally courageous should create some sort of moral meltdown. The trick, of course, is to show in a non-arbitrary manner that the conception of courage just presented is rather indefensible.
It might be useful to look at the difference between courage and the other virtues. Unlike courage, the other virtues are defined in terms of a specific kind of behavior that gets performed: telling the truth (honesty) or bestowing a benefit (generosity or kindness). Courage, by contrast, is primarily defined in terms of behavior that does not get performed: standing up for what one believes is about not backing down in the face of significant harm to one. Accordingly, all sorts of moral rift-raft can be courageous. Fortunately, there is a non-arbitrary way of showing that courage comes to more than standing up for what one believes at great risk to oneself.
Think of moral virtues as each being maximally consistent from the moral point of view in that in that exercising a moral virtue is incompatible with exhibiting a vice. It is obvious that kindness is maximally consistent in this way. Insofar as one is being kind, this is incompatible with being malicious towards another another.
The same holds true even for honesty. We know that the truth can hurt. But here the hurt does not stem from the desire to be malicious. If, when I ask you about the matter, you rightly and truthfully tell me that I lack the ability to succeed in philosophy, that truth may very well hurt me. This hurt, though, has everything to do with me having to change my goals reluctantly, and nothing to do with your having untoward motives. To be sure, if you see this as an occasion to tell me that I am the dumbest person whom you have ever met, then we have maliciousness.
If we apply to courage the model that the exercise of a virtue is incompatible with exhibiting a vice, then we can in fact rein in courage in a non-arbitrary way.
To state the obvious: causing gratuitous suffering is a vice even if one stands up to great harm in order to do so. Telling lies is the vice of mendacity. It is manifestly false that either all whites or all blacks or all Jews are either stupid or evil. There is no evidence at all from history that any group has a monopoly on either good or bad behavior. It goes without saying that risking harm in order to disseminate vicious lies or to cause gratuitous suffering is not in the least admirable. So harming others on the basis of these claims is surely a vice. That a person should stand up to all the world in order to do so does not change things at all. The Nation of Islam, the KKK, and neo-Nazis are similar in precisely this respect.
Now we can bring out the important respect in which courage is more like the other virtues that one might first suppose.
To be honest is not merely to tell the truth but to do so in the right way and the right time. Moreover, and this is particularly pertinent, there is the issue of choosing what to say and how one says it. At any given time, there are countless truths that one could utter that one most certainly should not utter, even after we set aside things uttered to one in confidence. Saying all that one knows to be true is a recipe for disaster on a multitude of fronts. To say all that one knows to be true, whenever one feels like doing so amounts to sheer viciousness. Observe the difference between saying to a man’s wife that “I saw your husband helping a woman who had been robbed” and “I saw your husband talking to a woman”. Both statements are true! If the event is all about the former, it is even wrong to begin with the latter claim, true though it is.
Analogous remarks hold for being kind. Kindness has to be suitable to who the person is. If a close friend were to give me season’s tickets to a football game, I would not quite know what to say; for I think that it is next to impossible to know me well and have the view that I have anything remotely resembling an interest in football. Worse still, would be to give me season’s tickets in the middle of religious services. The kind person has to choose to give the right things at the right time. We all know that giving the resident drunkard $100 is woefully inappropriate. Doing so is a vice rather than a virtue.
Some instances of truth telling can be a vice; and some instances of kindness can be a vice. By parity of reasoning, then, some instances of standing up for a view at great risk to oneself can also be a vice. Just as the honest person has to be committed to doing what is right and not just telling the truth, the courageous person has to be committed to standing up for the right sorts of views and not just doggedly advancing his views at great risk to himself. Otherwise, we end up with the utterly absurd view that, for instance, a man who claims that rape is good for woman is manifestly courageous, since any man who asserts such a view obviously puts himself at great risk given the ire that he raises against him by both women and men alike. And what exactly, I ask, is the difference between making that assertion and saying that either all whites or Jews or blacks are either evil or stupid?
Notice, though, that a man who asserts such a view regarding rape is apt to be ruthless. And Hitler himself was indeed ruthless. Ruthlessness is not about doing what is right but merely being brazen about having one’s way. Ruthlessness has something in common with courage, namely the ability to overcome fear of harm to oneself. Still, just as we do not have a display of the virtue of honesty simply because someone tells the truth (as telling the truth can have no other purpose than character assassination), we do not have a display of courage simply because a person overcomes fear of harm to herself. And just as we want a world of honest people and not just a world of people simply blurting out truths, we likewise want a world of courageous people and not just a world of people overcoming fear of harm to themselves. Or so it is if we what we truly want a world without vice.
The view that courage requires making the proper choice (as with all virtues) and that courage (as with all virtues) is incompatible with the exercise of vice, enables us to say with confidence that evil and courage are never partners.
