Im not entirely stunned that a man exposed himself on a subway in New York City. One figures that if such a thing is going to happen anywhere in the United States: New York City is the place. What absolutely stuns me, however, is that the man essentially defended his behavior. And one just has to ask how we did we get to the point in society where a person would defend exposing himself in a manifestly public setting. That people have exposed themselves is nothing new. But stridently defending such behavior on one’s part most certainly is. And this new piece of behavior cries out for an explanation.
The first thing worth noting pertains to the issue of community standards. In his famous essay entitled The Enforcement of Morals, Lord Patrick Devlin made the very simple point that society needs a sense of moral standards in order to survive. And although John Stuart Mill was a staunch defender of liberty, it is also the case that he recognized the importance of moral disapprobation.
If there is one difference between now and then, where then is a mere 20 years ago, it is that moral disapprobation has itself become the object of much disapprobation. We want things to be better without wanting to say that anyone is doing or has done anything wrong. Sometimes it is indeed the case that no one has done anything wrong. A person who has an unexpected heart attack while driving, which results in his crashing into a person’s home, has not done anything wrong.
Alas, a great deal of life is not like that at all. The harms that many people suffer are not a result of some unexpected failure of health or the constellation of the stars, but are owing to deliberate wrongdoing or willful negligence on the part of individuals. And it is mistake to carry on as if things were otherwise.
To be sure, it is important not to be edacious in our concern to blame people. As with kindness, one can go overboard with moral blame. The alternative to going overboard, though, is not to set moral blame aside entirely.
But that is what we have done. If, for example, a neighborhood is dangerous because it is surfeited with the crime of murder, it has become inappropriate to say that; for then it is said that one harbors some inappropriate bias. I would that I were joking about this. Alas, I am not. I have heard just this line of thought regarding one of the dangerous neighborhoods in Syracuse. The only bias that I see is a prudent concern for one’s safety, which any psychologically healthy person should have.
But this is just the point. It is plainly absurd to object to expressing moral disapprobation over the killings that are going on a neighborhood. But if we have been beaten into silence when it comes to condemning murders in a neighborhood, then over what can we express moral disapprobation.
If one engages in a kind of moral transitivity here with respect to moral criticism, then the following seems to hold: If expressing moral disapprobation over murder is inappropriate, then there will be lots and lots of lesser wrongs over which it will also be wrong to express moral disapprobation.
Offhand, it seems to me that between the act of indecent exposure and the act of murder, the latter is far, far worse. So if one is acting morally inappropriate in expressing moral disapprobation over murders that are occurring in a neighborhood, then surely it is woefully inappropriate to express moral disapprobation over indecent exposure. Or so it is if we accept a principle of moral transitivity with respect to moral criticism.
So there you have it: The basis for an explanation for why Mr. Daniel Hoyt thinks that his behavior of indecent exposure is just fine. Once we deem moral disapprobation out of order, then a kind of social check of our moral values is thereby removed. It may be true that some people can sustain high moral values all by themselves, but that is extremely rare. Most of us need reminders that take various forms. Moral disapprobation is one such form that a reminder can take, where the idea is not to excoriate the person but to draw attention to a transgression that has taken place.
Quite simply, then, silencing moral disapprobation has the effect of denying the reality of moral transgressions. Moral disapprobation underwrites and affirms our commitment to moral standards.
In general, what we feel comfortable saying is not independent of the moral standards of our society in general or our community in particular.
It is mistakenly supposed that moral criticism amounts to more than a form of harshness. Not so it. It amounts a form of moral husbandry—a kind of moral self-preservation, if you will. When done in the right way, moral criticism is a way of sanctifying the moral excellences that we want to anchor and to animate our lives. When done in the right way, moral criticism is a way of avowing to one another the standards that we hold precious, and so of the expectations that we have of ourselves and one another. And as we know, the kinds of expectations that people have of us can be ever so significant.
High expectations have occasioned considerable excellence. Low expectations, by contrast, have licensed considerable mediocrity. We know this to be true in the intellectual realm. It is a mistake to suppose that the same idea does not hold in the moral realm. It is the high regard that others have for me that so animates me.
It is not that I am given to flights of immorality. Rather, it is simply that the high regard that others have for me give me a reason that I would not have otherwise to do what is right; and in trying times that makes a difference.
Mr. Daniel Hoyt lives in a society that has lost its moral backbone, and so that which shapes moral sensibilities. Of course, he cannot hear the absurdity of his views. For society no longer provides the kind of moral echo that makes that reality a possibility. It did once upon a time. For, as I have noted, indecent exposure is not new. But time was when those who engaged in this despicable act would not have thought it even plausible to suppose that there was nothing wrong with so behaving. Certainly, none would have voiced such view even if he held it. It is not moral progress at all that such is no longer the case. And no small part of the problem is that with the rejection of moral disapprobation we cannot see how far down the abyss of immorality we have fallen.
