Rorbert L. Trivers is regarded as one of the most seminal thinkers writing in the area of evolutionary theory. His first three essay (1) “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism”, (2) “Parental Investment and Reproductive Success”, and (3) “Parent-Offspring Conflict” pretty much assured him a standing of first-rank in the area. These have all been collected in his book Natural Selection and Social Theory (Oxford University Press, 2002). I shall argue in what follows that his work points to a most unanticipated thesis, namely that evolutionary theory favors altruism over autonomy.
By definition, a stable society is one that endures over time. What is more conducive to a stable society, then: altruism or autonomy? The answer most surely is autonomy. The only way to block autonomy as an answer is to embrace a Kantian conception of autonomy (which woefully controversial); and it is clear that at the popular level folks simply do not mean the rich Kantian account of autonomy when they aver that blacks or women or people in general should be autonomous. Let us call this the folk-conception of autonomy.
Now, the folk conception of autonomy is understood to mean being independent in one’s thinking and arriving at conclusions based upon one’s own assessment of the situation. Needless to say, between altruism and the folk conception of autonomy, surely altruism is more conducive to a stable society than autonomy. This follows from the fact that there is nothing whatsoever about the folk conception of autonomy that entails a concern for the good of others, let alone a commitment to the well-being of others. Nor, is there anything about it that entails the weaker idea of mere cooperation.
In essay 1, Trivers argues for the view that from an evolutionary view we should expect for it to be the case that there would be a measure of altruism between members of a group, precisely because this would facilitate interaction within the group, as well as facilitate re-acceptance in the case of infractions and the like. Sentiments like shame and guilt facilitate the altruistic gesture of re-acceptance in the event that one has committed an infraction.
The important point, though, is that Trivers’ model in essay 1 cannot be employed to generate a like argument with respect to the folk conception of autonomy. There is absolutely nothing about the folk conception of autonomy that entails that autonomous individuals are disposed to be more altruistic.
Turning to essay 2, Trivers argument helps us to see the way in which females among mammals have a greater investment in their offspring from the moment of conception, since it is the females who carry the fetus to term and go through the travails of labor. So, from a purely evolutionary perspective, we might naturally expect females to have temperament, biologically based, for exhibiting altruism towards their offspring. As such a temperament would insure favorable behavior over time, which is a most relevant factor with regard to human beings.
Tt is easy to miss this, in the case of humans, because if we look at human beings through the eyes of modernity, where all sorts of effective contraceptive measures are available, then we have a situation of enormous reproductive control. Alas, this is a very recent reality.
Needless to say, the important point is that altruism on the part of female mammals, and so human beings, towards their offspring favors their offspring surviving until the offspring can reproduce in turn. And that, of course, is what evolution is all about: insuring that one’s own progeny reaches the point that they, in turn, can leave behind progeny. For human beings, unlike salmon and turtles (both of which survive by mass production), genuine expressions of altruism are absolutely necessary.
The bottom line here is this: From the standpoint of ensuring the survival of children until they can in turn reproduce, it is a-l-t-r-u-i-s-m and not autonomy that wins hands down. Altrusim make the decisive difference for the better terms of survival.
So we have yet another argument that favors altruism over autonomy.
Finally, in essay 3, the argument comes full circle. The ways in which parents and offspring compete is primarily over resources—not autonomy; for autonomy is not an issue among non-human animals. Surely, though, the thesis holds no less among human beings, with parents exercising formidable control over resources that children want. We can even assume for the sake of argument that children naturally become more autonomous. That truth does nothing whatsoever to change the reality of parents having enormous control over the resources to which the child would like to have access.
So from an evolutionary perspective, the phenomenon of autonomy has a most ancillary role. Or so it is vis à vis the role of altruism.
Now, I have most certainly not argued that the folk conception of autonomy is of little or not importance to human beings. I assume—nay, I know—that it is of considerable importance. The point, though, is that vis à vis the significance of altruism, the importance of autonomy pales in comparison. Most significantly, this is so even at the level of human beings, a point worth making precisely because it is only with human beings that the issue of being autonomous can even be an issue.
Many who embrace autonomy also embrace evolutionary theory. This makes for a most interesting tension, owing to the fact that the theory makes altruism fundamentally more important than the folk conception of autonomy. It is altruism, and not autonomy, that favors children reaching the point where they, in turn, can have children. And it is altruism, and not the folk conception of autonomy, that is the currency that creates a conflict between parents and children. Finally, it is altruism, and not autonomy, that makes for stability among group members.
To be sure, altruism without limits can have its own problems. But the irony is this. If biology tells us what we are like at a most fundamental level, then biology seems to suggest that the best societies are those that place a premium upon altruism rather than autonomy. Then there is the truth that it is altruism rather than the folk conception of autonomy that is more conducive to a stable society.
To the best of my knowledge, no one has ever noticed this tension. There seems to be little support, if any, from evolutionary theory that for humans being autonomous constitutes the fullest expression of ourselves as biological creatures. Certainly, there is nothing in evolution that would suggest that this holds more so for autonomy than for altruism.
Trivers is not a moral and poltical philosopher. So I am certain that he did not see this implication of his work. But it is characteristic of brilliant work, of which his is surely an instance, that it has implications in a direction that the author would never have imagined. Why, he might not even like the implications. That, however, is another matter entirely.
