Can the defense of equality be taken too far? Surely it can. Imagine someone arguing that true ethnic equality in society is possible only if marriages are assigned, thus assuring that there is a proper balance, whatever that might mean. Even if this line of thought were remotely plausible, not allowing people to marry according to their own preferences is an absolutely untenable idea.
One could very well believe that homosexuality and heterosexuality are identical in all respects without thereby supposing that any and all institutions must embrace and impose that view of things. The most obvious exception that enters the mind is religious institutions.
Significantly, one can refuse to embrace homosexuality as identical to heterosexuality without demonizing it. Thus, it is one thing for religious institutions not to put homosexuality on the same footing as heterosexuality. It is quite another entirely for religious institutions to demonize homosexuality. There can be no justification for demonizing homosexuality.
Can we respect religious freedom and force religious institutions to put homosexuality on the exact same plane as heterosexuality? Unequivocally, we cannot.
Can we respect religious freedom and insist the religious institutions not in any way demonize homosexuality? Unequivocally, we can.
Significantly, there are members of the American Philosophical Association (APA) who seem to be in favor of religious freedom while insisting that religiously-affiliated institutions put homosexuality on the exact same plane as heterosexuality. Indeed, the site PetitionOnLine has a petition to that effect. Either religiously-affiliated institutions put homosexuality on the same plane as heterosexuality or they are to be barred from using the resources of the American Philosophical Association. Interestingly, the counter petition is to be found at IPetitions.
One naturally wonders why are individuals in the American Philosophical Association not pushing for that option rather than merely pushing to insure that religious institutions do not in any way whatsoever demonize homosexuality. The answer, I suspect, has to do with the assumption that racial discrimination and discrimination against homosexuality are rather parallel.
Alas, there is a profound difference between the two, at least with regard to racial discrimination against blacks, which is often the model to which people appeal. That discrimination was primarily animated by the view that blacks are intellectually inferior. Lots of silly things were thought to follow from that view. But the presupposition of intellectual inferiority is what grounded racism against blacks. But it is clear that blacks in general were deemed not to have the intellectual wherewithal to pursue a commendable life-style, save that of being subordinate to a white. Finally, it should be noted that it is an incontrovertible evolutionary fact, and not an assessment of life-styles, that no ethnic group is intellectually inferior to any other ethnic group.
Discrimination against homosexuality has not been based upon the view that homosexuals are intellectual inferior. Rather, it is based upon the view that a given life-style is unacceptable. The characterization of unacceptability has changed over the years; and, of course, the claim unacceptability no longer exists for some. Yet, even for those who advocate the complete acceptance of homosexuality it is not at all clear what they mean, as with the APA’s insistence that there should be no bias according to gender identification.
What exactly makes it plausible to claim that one feels like a woman/man trapped in a man/woman’s body, the case of having both sets of genitals aside? If an individual with (for example) no Asian ancestry at all, repeatedly claimed to be an Asian person trapped in a black person’s body, most people would insist that this is just absurd. To my knowledge, I have never seen a good argument that explains why the first claim should be accepted, whereas the second claim should not be.
I understand that homosexuality and gender-identification are not exactly the same. Yet, they both raise the issue of life-style in ways that are in fact related. Or so it is if one assumes, for instance, that in some cases a person who feels like a woman trapped in a man’s body will want to have sex with a man. There is something extremely heavy-handed about insisting that this sort of identification-claim should be accepted by a religiously-affiliated institution when it is not even clear what justifies the basis for it other than a mere assertion.
Is it not more compatible with the ideal of religious freedom for the American Philosophical Association (A) to insure that religiously-affiliated institutions, which are a member of the APA and make use of its resources, are very clear about their policy regarding heterosexuality and homosexuality and (B) to insure that said institutions do not in any way subscribe to and endorse a morally obnoxious conception of homosexuality. If pursing these two aims does not constitute a more preferable approach, then what exactly does religious freedom mean for the American Philosophical Association?
Setting the issue of sexual orientation aside for a moment, there is an interesting formal point that is worth mentioning here. It is very nearly conceptually incoherent to hold that all life-styles are on the same social and moral plane. No one really thinks that a life-style of doing nothing more than smoking pot all day, 365 days a year, is preferable to mastering the arts in some way. Likewise, I am rather confident that no one thinks that being a high-paid prostitute (male or female) is preferable to being a brilliant scientist.
A related point is that rejecting a given life-style does not entail that those who pursue that life-style are inferior human beings. By contrast, the insistence that group A is intellectually inferior to group B entails inferiority across a number of domains with respect to group A. As I have argued in “Moral Equality and Natural Inferiority,” it is conceptually difficult to have intellectual inferiority for a race without moral inferiority for that race as well.
Now, philosopher are notorious for all sorts of distinctions—distinctions that the average person on the street barely even fathom. Yet, in rushing to assimilate discrimination against homosexuality to discrimination against race (for example, blacks), philosophers have ignored a number of important distinctions. If nothing else, this is unfair to religiously-affiliated institutions.
The very nature of the charge of black inferiority entails that blacks are lesser human beings. It is possible to hold that the life-style of heterosexuality is preferable to the life-style of homosexuality without thinking for a moment that, vis-à-vis heterosexuals, homosexuals are lesser human beings.
Just as we should not create differences where there are none, it is also the case that we should not ignore important differences that exist.
I have offered an account of matters which makes it clear that there is some moral space which the American Philosophical Association would do well to respect if, indeed, it is serious about its respect for religious freedom.
In the academy, there is an awful lot of hostility towards religion nowadays. The sad part is that this cauldron of hostility has resulted in the same sort of dismissive attitudes and moral blindness to distinctions that we find characteristic of those who are deeply biased in morally obnoxious ways. Why being hostile to religion has almost become a requirement for acceptance.
