Friday, April 28

David Duke and the University: The Wisdom of John Stuart Mill
by
Laurence Thomas
on Fri 28 Apr 2006 03:56 PM CEST
know of course that Mr. David Duke is persona non gratae on college campuses. Still, I have a pretty good imagination; and I have always imagined a great debate between me and David Duke. As is well known, Duke was at one point in time the personification of the idea that blacks and other minorities are intellectually inferior. It is, obviously, a good thing that universities reject that view.
The mistake, of course, is in supposing that the rejection of that view entails precluding all public forums at the university that might involve David Duke or, in general, a debate of that view. Not so, however.
I suggest that nothing would be more in keeping with the idea that all are equal than a masterful debate with David Duke or others of his persuasion. Not because this would be tantamount to giving Duke a hearing. But because it would give scholars the opportunity to show that David Duke’s views are utterly bankrupt. And I maintained that seeing such a thing demonstrated through reasoned argument would be an absolutely wonderful and affirming experience for all.
You see, I hold the very simple view that nothing beats experience. To be sure, there is nothing to be said for experiencing some thing. For instance, I have never had a bone in my body broken. And, quite frankly, I am not going to do anything to help matters along in this regard. I most certainly am not going to do so that I may understand more fully the suffering of those who have suffered a broken bone.
Anyways, the point is not simply that nothing beats experience. Rather, the point is that nothing beats the experience of excellence. People can go around saying “I can do anything” or “I can be anything I want to be”. This they can do until the cows come home, or whatever it is that cows do that makes the expression relevant here. But such utterances are no substitute for actual instances of success. Indeed, they become rather hallow in the absence of actual instances of success. Nothing affirms one’s belief that one can perform an excellence like an unequivocal display of excellence on one’s part.
This truth points to why we must be so judicious with praise. For we deflate its value if we offer high praise for anything that a person might do. There is, to be sure, the wrong of with holding praise where praise is due. Alas, this wrong is not corrected by praising a person no matter what.
Coming back to David Duke, I find that I am becoming increasingly cynical. For instance, I am less persuaded than I used to be that people actually believe what they say. David Duke is no dummy. Hitler was no dummy. Holding a morally reprehensible view does not suffice to make one intellectually bereft.
This is why I maintain that those who hold such views should be publicly debated. That said, I want to acknowledge Mr. Brian Romm’s point.
What I take to be appropriate is not a shouting match where, say, liberal college students drown out every word that Duke utters with their boos. There would be nothing to be said for bringing Duke to a campus for that. One could simply show a picture of him or a film of him speaking. And in turn folks could boo his image to their hearts content.
The truth, though, is that boos do not constitute an argument. Accordingly, there really is a limit to how much satisfaction we should take in them. Indeed, I worry when we take too much satisfaction in our booing another. For I wonder whether our booing is masking a painfully reality, namely that we do not have in our intellectual arsenal the arguments that are necessary to show that the individual’s point of view—say, David Duke’s position—is intellectually bankrupt.
The kernel of racism is the view that blacks are intellectually inferior. Accordingly, what would be far more affirming of the intellectual equality of blacks than booing him is blacks marshalling or witnessing the marshalling of compelling arguments against his view.
If this is right, then there is a most important respect in which contemporary liberalism is failing minorities. Indeed, it may be more of the problem than not.
We know that it is possible for parents to be over-protective. This does not mean that the parents are not well-intentioned. Rather, it points to the truth that their good intentions are not by themselves sufficient. Good intentions are not sufficient in other aspects of life as well.
I believe in equality. And I believe that I can out argue David Duke any day of the week. I believe that I can do so squarely and fairly. Thus, I do not need boos from the audience as a crutch. Not only that, I maintain that my belief in equality would be rather vapid if I were not willing to debate in a fair manner a person like David Duke.
If I am even remotely right, then a most point truth is that college campuses have been more than a little over-protective of minorities. Campuses have become an environment in which people pat themselves on the back for all having the same views and for vituperatively denouncing those do who do not embrace their views. While this may feel good to others, this mindset has continuously left me feeling empty. We all believe in equality. And we spend next to no time earnestly presenting the other side so that its weaknesses can be revealed.
This is precisely why a debate with David Duke or someone like him is so very important in the struggle for equality. And, of course, this applies with equal force to all aspects of that struggle: women versus men; Asians versus non-Jews. And so on. Mill’s point, quite simply, is that the best proof that the other side holds a mistaken view is that we can show that its best arguments are unsatisfactory. And in order to do that precisely what we may need is our worse enemy rather than our best friend.
The argument of this essay makes explicit a view that Mill presumably held, namely that in adequately arguing against the best views that the opposition can present we provide ourselves with a most profound measure of affirmation both morally and psychologically (or both). This is because we are no longer merely telling ourselves that this or that view is intellectually bankrupt. No, we have moved way beyond that; for we have then experienced the view as being intellectually bankrupt precisely because the arguments of the view’s most articulate have been shown to be inadequate right before our very eyes. That would be a majestic moment that no amount of booing can produce, as I assume Brian Romm so nicely grasped.
Thus, a most poignant question arises: Are we up to the task? Once upon a time, I would have thought that the answer was obviously an affirmative one. However, we have become a boo-based culture. Accordingly, it is no longer clear to me that we are.
Wednesday, April 19

Inferiority and Equality: The KKK, Liberalism, and the Charge of Racism
by
Laurence Thomas
on Wed 19 Apr 2006 01:46 AM CEST
Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University
here is a very profound respect in which liberalism has failed students in college, and is continuing to fail them. This is because when it comes to matters involving race liberalism has become more than a little too content with the invoking the rhetorical force of the charge of racism when in fact there are arguments that can be presented. And one most untoward consequence of this is that some fundamental beliefs of the American society are turning out to be no more than dead dogma rather than living beliefs—a distinction that was introduced by John Stuart Mill in his masterful essay On Liberty.
Like any reasonable person, I understand that there have been injustices in the world; and that blacks have been the object of some of these injustices. Injustices of this sort typically fly under the banner of racism. From this truth, however, what does not follow is that the charge of racism is always the best explanation for an argument that purports to show that superiority of whites. Today in lecture (18 April 2006), I presented the following argument that was presented by a member of the KKK:
1. The list of geniuses includes, among others, the following:
Charles Darwin, Isaac Newton, Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein, Shakespeare, Beethoven, Mozart, Kant, Hume, Rousseau, and so on.
2. All of these individuals are an X. Hence, none of these individuals is of the Y or Z or W or . . . whatever race except the X race.
3. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that as a race Xs are more intelligent than members of the Y race or the Z race or the W race . . . or any other race.
Now, as it happens, the above KKK argument does not work; and I asked my class to explain why.
In passing, I should point out that the KKK argument is complicated by the reality that KKK folks hate Jews; yet, two Jews are on that list. So a KKK person can say that he or she is not blind to talent even when that talent displays itself in people who are despised by KKK folks.
Getting back to the argument: There are two kinds of responses that are immediately offered. One I shall label the genius uplift response; the other I shall label the victim of racism response. According, to the uplift response, there are lots of blacks that belong on that list: e.g., Stevie Wonder, Aretha Franklin, Jimmy Hendrix, and George Washington Carver. There is no denying the talent of these names. But let us see.
I think that Elton John and Stevie Wonder are on a par with one another when it comes to musical talent. Yet, surely Elton does not think for a moment, and rightly so, that he is on a par with Mozart or Beethoven. So, by parity of reasoning, it follows that Stevie Wonder is not on a par with Mozart or Beethoven, and not think such a thing. Nor, for that matter is, Aretha Franklin.
Martin Luther King, Jr. was also mentioned as someone who should be on the. I would place him on the same plane as Winston Churchill. Neither, though, makes that very dis-tinguished KKK list.
As for George Washington Carver, there is no doubt that he had considerable talent. But he was no Darwin or Freud or Einstein. No doubt, Carver was Nobel Prize material. Yet, many Nobel Prize winners do not hold a candle to Darwin or Freud or Newton or Einstein. So the uplift response proves to be rather unsuccessful.
The victim response insists that were it not for the vicious racism that blacks have suffered down through the years, then there would be blacks on the list. I presume that this is true. And as one student observed, it may very well be that Shakespeare did really do all that writing, but some blacks instead.
The victim argument may very well have more weight in the minds of my students than the uplift argument. The problem with the victim argument is that it still leaves one empty-handed. It is rather like saying that one would have earned a Ph.D. had one gone to graduate school. Unless one has done something that makes this claim manifestly obvious, there is a respect in which the claim rings hollow. That blacks would have been on the list had things been otherwise is no substitute for being on the list. I do not think that any genuine satisfaction derives from running around saying “I could have been on that list”.
You see, the problem with the victim argument is that it still privileges the list in a way that requires an explanation for why blacks are not on it. Accordingly, I think that those who spend so much time advocating the uplift argument miss a marvelous opportunity to advance a much more im-portant argument. A far better strategy would be to show that, in the relevant respects, not much turns on not being on the list. I presented that argument in lecture today.
What does the KKK argument show about the intelligence of Xs? It most certainly does not show that any random X chosen is apt to be more talented than any random non-X chosen. That is to say, from the fact that only Xs are on the list, what does not follow at all is that only Xs are gifted or likely to be gifted. After all, only human beings are on the list, too. Less flippantly, from the fact that only Xs are on the list does not show that there is a strong correlation between being an X and being on the list. There could not possibly be.
Why? Because there are millions upon millions of Xs who are manifestly and unambiguously not on the list. Likewise for millions and millions of Ys or Ws or whatever. No X can look at himself and think that it was just as likely that he or the other person would be on the list as not. For if anything is true it is true that it notoriously unlikely that anyone would be on that list; and it does not matter whether the person is an X or a non-X. But then it follows from all of this that with regard to intelligence Xs as such and Ys as such and Ws as such are all on the same plane.
The probability of being on the list is painfully small and equally small whether one is an X or a Y or a W or what-ever race. 9 or so people on the list out of millions and millions of people of one racial group is statistically the same as 0 people on the list out of millions and millions of people from another racial group.
This argument does not in any way downplay the extraordi-nary contributions of the people who are intellectual giants. It merely points out that nothing of any signi-ficance follows with regard to one race or the other given the simple fact that all on the list turn out to be white.
This argument thus diffuses the standing of the list. So no non-X need find the list in any way threatening because non-Xs are not on the list.
Returning back to Mill’s distinction between living beliefs and dead dogma, I trust that the class can see that I have done something extremely important. Without in any way resorting to either the uplift or the victim argument, I have completely diffused the argument pre-sented by the KKK person. And it seems to me that, prior to lecture, way too many of this class could not even envision this possibility.
Worse, it seems to me that one of the deep and painful shortcomings of political correctness is that it is much too willing to avail itself of the charge of racism rather than look for what in fact would be a far effective and devastating argument. The uplift argu-ment cheapens the intellectual contributions of a Darwin or a Freud or a Mozart. In this regard, the victim argument is a better argument.
On the other hand, there is a straightforward sense in which advocates of the victim argu-ment are held hostage by the very ideology that they eschew. That blacks or members of any other group are not on the list is problematic only if not being on the list represents something nega-tive about the intellectual wherewithal of blacks or others as a race.
Showing that this is not the case is actually better than making the charge of racism. Thus, it seems to me that for some invoking the charge of racism is rather like a drug to which one is addicted. And the proof of this is that some continued appealing to the victim argument even after I had given the argument that I gave regarding the fact no significance at all, regarding the matter of intelligence between the races, attaches to the fact that all the members of the list are white, since the racial composition of the list does not show that Xs as a group are in any way more likely to be more intelligent than non-Xs.
The power of the argument that I have given, if the argu-ment is sound, is that it renders otiose both the uplift and the victim arguments—not by denying the reality of racism, but by drawing attention to the truth that the best explanation for apparent differences be-tween races may have noth-ing at all to do with race precisely because the ap-parent differences turn out to be just that: merely apparent rather than real.
© Laurence Thomas 2006
Friday, March 24

Licensing Parents: Risks and Slippery Slopes
by
Laurence Thomas
on Fri 24 Mar 2006 09:18 PM CET
Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University
Hugh Lafollette’s essay, “Licensing Parents,”1 raises many, many interesting and intense feelings on the part of its readers; I shall not argue that he is right or wrong. Rather, I wish merely to address some of the inappropriate arguments against his view.
Many argue that Lafollette’s position amount to some form of eugenics. But this is so much nonsense. For eugenics is about invoking utterly inappropriate criteria for eliminating people off the first of the earth—normally a well-identified group of people. Whatever, Lafollette is proposing he is not proposing eliminating people off the first of the earth. Nor, again, is he proposing inappropriate criteria for determining who might be a fit parent or not. Height or foot size or waist size (and the like) are utterly irrelevant when it comes the qualities that are required in order to be a good parent, as is education or economic wherewithal generally. And Lafollette does not even come close to appealing to these things in his essay.
Now, there is a concern that was broached by Ames and Berman, namely the slippery slope: Where on earth do we draw the line?
Well, it is interesting that human beings can be very, very good at drawing lines. Here is an example. Children can be forcibly taken away from their parents if the parents are abusing their children. This socially accepted practice has not at all generated any abuse. Children are not taken away from parents merely because the parents are gay or merely because they drink too much alcohol or merely because they gamble too much. The socially accepted practice of taking abused children away from their parents has not at all resulted in anything that remotely resemble systematic abuse in the matter of taking children away from their parents. Certainly, all of us know some pretty terrible parents who are in no danger, nor ever were in danger, of having their children taken away from them.
So we know as a matter of hard reality that from the fact that a practice is, in principle, susceptible to abuse, there need not be any abuse of the practice at all. In the case removing children from their parents, the reason why there is virtually no abuse at all is precisely because there is such a strong presumption in favor of parents raising their own children that one had to move heaven and earth in order for the idea that children should be moved from their parents (in the case of physical abuse) to gain a foothold upon the members of society.
Any practice can be abused; from which it does not follow that every practice will be abused. In the fantasy story that I put forward, where Schmo has a hard genetic disposition for being abusive of infants and intolerant of their behavior, it is far from obvious that not allowing persons with the Schmo genetic disposition to have children would result in widespread abuse, and that suddenly ugly people and poor people and gay people and people with broad noses would not be allowed to have children. For the practice of removing abused children from their parents reveals has not over the course of time rendered us rather blasé about removing children form their parents. Not in the slightest. There is no evidence at all of a proclivity to take children away from their parents for other reasons.
I turn now to an issue raised by Mr. Wilson after class. It is an indisputable fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life. From this, though, it does not follow that we should not take precautions where we can. What is more, notwithstanding the fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life what most certainly does not follow is that it is just fine to expose people to risks. Thus, I may not play Russian roulette with you on the grounds that, after all, life is full of risks. From the fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life, it is true nonetheless that I have no right whatsoever to raise (beyond the acceptable level as determined by the circumstances) the risk that you shall be harmed. Driving, even sober, raises the risk that someone will be harmed. Driving while intoxicated raises the risk to an unacceptable level.
Now, the law allows us to arrest people who are driving while they are intoxicated. The law is not that a driver needs to injure a person first. So when it comes to matters, the laws does allow for preventive measures. If there is one good thing that MADD has done it has raised our awareness of just how wrong it is to drive while intoxicated, though doing that alone does not constitute injuring someone. No, doing so merely constitutes raising the risk of injuring someone to a most unacceptable level.
So there is someone with the Schmo genetic disposition. In view of the considerations that have been advanced in these remarks, the question that forcibly arises is quite simple: Why on earth should we persons like him to bring innocent children into the world?
The truth of the matter is that the law does allow for us to take preventive measures; and drunk driving is a clear and unambiguous precedent in this regard. Not only that, it is a precedent that we all accept, without thinking for a moment that we sit at the top of some slippery slope and that it is just a matter of time before we won’t be do anything owing to laws of prevention. Not even the ACLU, which can see a reason to reject just about any prohibition, has seen fit to challenge laws against drunk driving.
In the end, Lafollette’s proposal may be indefensible. But surely someone should at least give voice to the concerns of those who cannot speak for themselves.
______________
1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(1980).
Friday, February 17

Philosophy 191 at SU: Romance, Honesty, and Validation
by
Laurence Thomas
on Fri 17 Feb 2006 12:50 AM CET
Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University
There is a line of argument that goes rather like this: We romance at its best only if it is built upon foundation of trust; and we can have foundation of trust only if there is complete honesty. From this it is somehow supposed to follow that all truths should be uttered. Or, in any case, a much weaker thesis is held, namely that all questions should be answered truthfully. This is truth as a god and that, I believe, is a fundamental mistake. Truth is a social lubricant; and when it is manifestly clear that truth is having the very opposite effect, then that should give us pause. To go on about the importance of truth notwithstanding the irrevocable damange that it is doing is to have a fetish about telling the truth. And there is nothing whatsoever virtuous about that. I would not have thought truth more valuable than life itself. We make exceptions with regard to life. So it is unfathomable to me that there should be no exceptions to telling the truth.
Now, I think it rather significant that I went from the strong thesis that
Romantic couples should utter all truths to one another
to the substantially weaker thesis that
All questions should be answered truthfully
The difference here is enormous. Can you imagine “Hi honey, I was talking to Adrian who, as it happens, is more physically attractive than you are”? To the best of my knowledge, making an utterance such as this is tantamount to courting sheer disaster a romantic relationship; for part of what makes each partner secure in the love of the other is the reality that other sees her or his beloved as having a constellation of attractiveness that no amount of excellence along a single dimension can possibly equal. Telling a beloved that someone else is more beautiful is the equivalent of calling that constellation of attractiveness into question. This is so although, of course, it most certainly is true that someone is more physically attractive or more intelligent. And so on.
To utter to one’s spouse that Adrian, say, is more attractive is to privilege the physical features of another, which is precisely what should not be done. At any rate, the utterance has the effect of doing this, whatever one’s intentions may be. And part of the reason for this is just the fact that one volunteered the information. For in doing so, one has already indicated that the person’s physical attractiveness is some of importance to one. And there is no way to prevent the slide from the other’s physical attractiveness having some importance to its having too much importance, given that one volunteered the information.
The question that I put to my Philosophy 191 class was the following:
Suppose that Shlomo-Abulah asks his male friends whether they have ever lusted after his incredibly beautiful wife, Angelica. Should they answer that they have if, indeed, they have? Similarly, if the wife of each friend asks her husband whether he has lusted after Shlomo-Abulah’s incredibly beautiful wife, should he answer that he has if, indeed, he has? It is understood that none of the friends would ever, ever have sexual relations with Angelica.
My answer was quite simple: In either case, absolutely not.
In a word, there is something woefully problematic about validating that we have had a sexual interest in another besides our beloved. For to validate that interest is to give it a reality in the eyes of the beloved that was not there before. This is so notwithstanding the fact that we all understand the erotic aspect of physical beauty.
Yet, recognizing all too well that one’s spouse might feel a twinge of eroticism when the smoking hot individual walks by is light years away from having one’s mere intellectual grasp of human reality validated by one’s spouse. For we have moved from a recognition on one’s part regarding a human reality to an actual acknowledgment on the part of one’s spouse this reality has played itself in our or his life.
The mere thought that one’s spouse might have had a lustful thought about So-and-So can easily enough be put out of mind or held in perspective. The acknowledgment on the part of one’s spouse that she or he has had such a thought takes it out of the realm of one’s mere reflections on a possibility and turns it into an unalterable reality. And that, needless to say, is no small difference.
Mutatis mutandis, the same thing holds with regard to Shlomo-Abdulah’s question to his friend’s. If he knows that his wife is incredibly beautiful, then probably understands that any number of people have had a lustful thought about her, their best intentions notwithstanding. But an acknowledgement to that effect from each friends transforms matters from a speculative thought in one’s own mind about people in general to a concrete reality about this and friend’s behavior. And concrete reality about their behavior will never go back into the box of mere speculation. This is why, in so many cases, acts of infidelity are to marriage what rust is to iron—a corrosive that cannot be stopped.
A lustful thought, of course, is no act of infidelity. But the acknowledgment of a lustful thought to one’s beloved is explicit validation that one has a found another sexually interesting. And there ain’t nothing at all trivial about that.
These remarks show the fallacy of reasoning according to which there is no difference at all between, on the one hand, a truth of humanity that a person has to know, if she or he has any sense at all and, on the other, an explicit and concrete instantiation of that truth by way of a person’s behavior in space and time. Despite their best efforts, a human being can find herself or himself riveted by the erotic beauty of another. This is a simple reality. What is forgotten is that the instantiation of that reality in one’s own person is itself yet another reality.
The usual objection to prevarication has to do with the fact that lying is self-serving. But lying need not be self-serving at all. We can in fact lie to preserve an extraordinary good in life—indeed, an extraordinary good in another’s life.
In the case of the example that I gave to my class, the lie preserves the sanctity of marriage that we have when two lives are eternally committed to one another. Passing moments of lust that may or may not reflect human frailty should not at all be given any more of a life, and validation, than they had. To share that one has had such moments, in the name of telling the truth, is to do more harm than good by putting the flesh of intentionality upon the mere bones of reality.
Friday, January 27

PHILOSOPHY 191 at SU: Simple Minded Pro-Life & Pro-Choice Folks
by
Laurence Thomas
on Fri 27 Jan 2006 12:34 AM CET
Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University
here is no shortage of simple-mindedness in the world; and perhaps nowhere is this more evident than with regard to the topic of abortion. Both sides, I believe, are guilty of considerable simplemindedness.
On the face of it, but only on the face of it, the conservative view appears to be the most consistent: It holds that we have a full-fledge person from the moment of conception. But very few conservatives truly believe this; and the evidence is the following: Not even the staunchest conservative really places the miscarriage of a 2-month old fetus on a par with the loss of a newborn infant who dies of, for example, SIDS (sudden infant death syndrome) while sleeping. Many a very decent woman has miscarried at two months and simply threw the fetus in the garbage without giving the matter any further thought. Indeed, many a decent woman has done this would never think to have an abortion.
By contrast, it is inconceivable that a decent woman would lose her child via SIDS and not grieve the loss of that child. Naturally, there would be funeral.
Conservatives are so busy thinking that they have the upper hand through sheer consistency of argument that they miss a very deep, deep inconsistency in their own thinking. A woman who took pictures of a miscarried fetus of two months, had a funeral, and hung a picture up of the fetus because after all it is a full-fledge person would strike anyone, including any pro-life person, as mad.
Liberals are so busy being utterly dismissive of conservatives that they miss the opportunity to draw attention to this inconsistency on the part of conservatives. Conservatives, on the other hand, have gotten so self-righteous about their view that they do not see the glaring inconsistency, to which I have drawn attention, in their own thought.
A great many liberals hold the view that fetus has little or no moral value; hence, a woman can abort whenever she chooses without committing anything remotely resembling an egregious moral wrong. Yet, as I indicated in lecture today, if a person could manage to kill a three-month old fetus without causing any harm to the woman carrying the child, there are very few women, if any, who would react to the loss of the killed fetus as woman reaction to the miscarriage of a two month-old fetus. And in a great many states, a person who committed the act of killing a two-month old fetus can be tried for murder.
A consistent pro-choice person ought to react to the killing of a two-month rather like I might react to someone’s destroying my copy of an original 1946 printing of Jean-Paul Sartre’s Réflexions sur la question juive. I have been wronged, obviously; and it is equally obvious that the loss cannot be replaced. Still, nothing remotely resembling a murder has taken place.
There is rather straightforward sense in which I am perfectly free to destroy my copy of Réflexion sur la question juive. After all, it is my damn book; and I am free to destroy it or protect as I please. But needless to say: the argument cannot be that whether the fetus that has been killed, by a third party, in a woman’s womb is a person or not is merely a function of whether or not she wants to keep the fetus. That is, whether we have a murder or not in this instance cannot be merely a function of a person’s desires.
By the way, the story of Scott Peterson is a real-life case of just this point. The fetus he killed, the woman who was carrying it had a right, by California law, to abort it. NOW initially opposed charging Peterson with murder but backed off. Scott Peterson was in fact convicted of murder.
Now, as I have maintained in class, I am not about to take a position regarding the matter. Absolutely not. What interest me is the simple truth that both the conservative and the liberal view regarding abortion can both be shown to be problematic merely on grounds of logical consistency. Whether I am pro-life or not, the problem with the pro-life position to which I have drawn attention is still there. Likewise, whether I am pro-life or not, the problem with the pro-life position to which I have drawn attention is still there.
Without taking a stand on the abortion issue, I may nonetheless have done something useful. I may have shed some light on why the issue remains such a controversial one. The answer, in a nutshell, is that in truth neither side has an internally consistent position. Moreover, the cost of rendering each view consistent seems to be too great. Pro-life folks, on the one hand, could insist upon funerals for the miscarried fetus and pictures of the fetus on the mantle-piece. This, obviously, borders on the macabre. Pro-choice folks, on the other, could insist that killing a fetus in the womb constitutes no more of a murder, or even a wrongdoing, than killing a person’s pet rat. This, of course, is radically incongruous with the very idea of wanting to be pregnant.
The proof, if you will, that the above remarks carry no ideological bias against abortion or for abortion is precisely the fact that nothing that I have said in these remarks alone gives one a clue as to where I stand on the issue. That is, there is not, on the basis of what I have written in these remarks, even a scintilla of a hint with regard to my own views on abortion.
I conclude with a poignant observation: Most members of Philosophy 191 has discussed the other side as if it were utterly silly and completely indefensible. Indeed, it seems to me that what most present as the other side is but a caricature of the moral weight that is constitutive of the opposing view, all the while ignoring the deep inconsistency in the view that he or she espouses—responding rather like a deer encountering headlights when anyone draws attention to it. This is why the abortion debate has proven to be so intractable.
Friday, January 20

PHILOSOPHY 191 at SU: Courage
by
Laurence Thomas
on Fri 20 Jan 2006 12:56 AM CET
Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University
Thanks to Ms. Clive Tucceri, Philosophy 191 has gotten off to a quite excellent start. She suggested that courage can be essentially understood as overcoming fear. This makes courage a morally neutral concept. Thus, Adolf Hitler and Martin Luther King can both have courage. Or, to put the point another way and more generally, there is nothing about being an evil person that makes it the case that courage is less within her or his reach.
Now, it has been pointed out by various individuals that, as a matter of fact, Hitler not all that courageous at all. That is, although he himself did some rather mean talking, his behavior did not in reality match his words. This point has been made in writing by, for example, Mr. Gavin Jones. However, Tucceri can acknowledge this point without supposing the the substance of her claim is diminished. For though it may be true of Hitler that he was actually a coward, this does not mean that he could not have been courageous in the way that Ms. Tucceri is understanding the term.
Ms. Clare Rutz does not reject the importance of overcoming fear, but she adds a most important qualification, namely that the act must be selfless in terms of its motivation. Messieurs Bach and Meisel are of the mind that courage need not be all that selfless; and they both both offer a similar type of example: the underdog who is told to go away, but who hangs in there nonetheless and who ultimately proves to be rather successful.
Kyle Maynard is undoubtedly a case in point. Born with a birth defect that left him essentially without fully-formed limbs, he went on to become a very successful wrestler. What is surely the case, however, is that at the outset many people did not take him seriously, supposing that he was merely joking or that he had a most ludicrous wish. But he prevailed and went on to gain the admiration of all around him.
But does Kyle Maynard really fail to exemplify the selflessness of which Rutz speaks? Well, yes and no. On the one hand, it is clear that he was working to help himself and not others. On the other, though, Maynard was not about acquiring material goods or having more fame than others. Rather, he was about not letting the obvious impediment of being without well-formed limbs get in the way of his becoming a wrestler. That is, Maynard's behavior was self-regarding but not egotistical.
As an aside, it is true that whether a person acts courageously can turn upon the individual's talents or skills with regard to the circumstances. Obviously, I have no fear talking in front of hundreds whereas this might be rather like a nightmare for another. This does not turn courage into a purely subjective notion like tastes. Ms. Tucceri is right to point out that overcoming fear is a most aspect of courage. And your fear is hardly anything but real just because I do not have fear under like circumstances.
Now, there is a reason why we do not normally think of overcoming overwhelming odds in order to achieve an excellence as egotistical. Not wallowing in self-pity and not being discouraged or dismayed by all those who doubt that one can achieve the excellence in question hardly counts as being egotistical. Indeed, there is in truth something remarkably selfless about doing so. Why? Because a person who presses on though she or he had every excuse not to and though no one would have blamed her or him for not trying (or for immediately giving up upon trying) and though in the first place everyone thought her or him to be foolish for trying is a person who gives of herself or himself for the sake of excellence. What is more, although the success of such individuals of typically occasions much public recognition or even fame, all of that pales in face of the most important of all triumphs, namely that a moral victory of the human spirit was snatched from the very jaws of despair. It is a testimony to the will of the human spirit to triumph, and to do so mightily, over the vicissitudes of life. That is precisely why such individuals invariably serve as an example of what we can do if only we should be willing to press on in the face of the multitude of ever-excuses of which we could so readily avail ourselves.
This, to be sure, is not the selflessness of laying down one's life for another. Yet, it is nothing at all like the selfishness that makes having more than others the most important thing, if not the only thing, worth striving for.
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