Philosophy 191 at Syracuse University

Hugh Lafollette’s essay, “Licensing Parents,”1 raises many, many interesting and intense feelings on the part of its readers; I shall not argue that he is right or wrong.  Rather, I wish merely to address some of the inappropriate arguments against his view.

Many argue that Lafollette’s position amount to some form of eugenics.  But this is so much nonsense.  For eugenics is about invoking utterly inappropriate criteria for eliminating people off the first of the earth—normally a well-identified group of people.  Whatever, Lafollette is proposing he is not proposing eliminating people off the first of the earth.  Nor, again, is he proposing inappropriate criteria for determining who might be a fit parent or not.  Height or foot size or waist size (and the like) are utterly irrelevant when it comes the qualities that are required in order to be a good parent, as is education or economic wherewithal generally.  And Lafollette does not even come close to appealing to these things in his essay. 

Now, there is a concern that was broached by Ames and Berman, namely the slippery slope: Where on earth do we draw the line?

Well, it is interesting that human beings can be very, very good at drawing lines.  Here is an example.  Children can be forcibly taken away from their parents if the parents are abusing their children.  This socially accepted practice has not at all generated any abuse.  Children are not taken away from parents merely because the parents are gay or merely because they drink too much alcohol or merely because they gamble too much.  The socially accepted practice of taking abused children away from their parents has not at all resulted in anything that remotely resemble systematic abuse in the matter of taking children away from their parents.  Certainly, all of us know some pretty terrible parents who are in no danger, nor ever were in danger, of having their children taken away from them.

So we know as a matter of hard reality that from the fact that a practice is, in principle, susceptible to abuse, there need not be any abuse of the practice at all.  In the case removing children from their parents, the reason why there is virtually no abuse at all is precisely because there is such a strong presumption in favor of parents raising their own children that one had to move heaven and earth in order for the idea that children should be moved from their parents (in the case of physical abuse) to gain a foothold upon the members of society.

Any practice can be abused; from which it does not follow that every practice will be abused.  In the fantasy story that I put forward, where Schmo has a hard genetic disposition for being abusive of infants and intolerant of their behavior, it is far from obvious that not allowing persons with the Schmo genetic disposition to have children would result in widespread abuse, and that suddenly ugly people and poor people and gay people and people with broad noses would not be allowed to have children.  For the practice of removing abused children from their parents reveals has not over the course of time rendered us rather blasé about removing children form their parents.  Not in the slightest.  There is no evidence at all of a proclivity to take children away from their parents for other reasons. 

I turn now to an issue raised by Mr. Wilson after class.  It is an indisputable fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life.  From this, though, it does not follow that we should not take precautions where we can.  What is more, notwithstanding the fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life what most certainly does not follow is that it is just fine to expose people to risks.  Thus, I may not play Russian roulette with you on the grounds that, after all, life is full of risks.  From the fact that risks are an ineliminable part of life, it is true nonetheless that I have no right whatsoever to raise (beyond the acceptable level as determined by the circumstances) the risk that you shall be harmed.  Driving, even sober, raises the risk that someone will be harmed.  Driving while intoxicated raises the risk to an unacceptable level. 

Now, the law allows us to arrest people who are driving while they are intoxicated.  The law is not that a driver needs to injure a person first.  So when it comes to matters, the laws does allow for preventive measures.  If there is one good thing that MADD has done it has raised our awareness of just how wrong it is to drive while intoxicated, though doing that alone does not constitute injuring someone.  No, doing so merely constitutes raising the risk of injuring someone to a most unacceptable level.

So there is someone with the Schmo genetic disposition.  In view of the considerations that have been advanced in these remarks, the question that forcibly arises is quite simple: Why on earth should we persons like him to bring innocent children into the world?

The truth of the matter is that the law does allow for us to take preventive measures; and drunk driving is a clear and unambiguous precedent in this regard.  Not only that, it is a precedent that we all accept, without thinking for a moment that we sit at the top of some slippery slope and that it is just a matter of time before we won’t be do anything owing to laws of prevention.  Not even the ACLU, which can see a reason to reject just about any prohibition, has seen fit to challenge laws against drunk driving. 

In the end, Lafollette’s proposal may be indefensible.  But surely someone should at least give voice to the concerns of those who cannot speak for themselves. 

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1 Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(1980).