But, alas, a great many of the world’s problems stem just the fact that it is indeed permissible to assert (i) while rejecting (ii).  So some people who consider themselves morally decent individuals think that it is quite all right to kill manifestly innocent people, including innocent children who are simply on their way to school.  In the years immediately following World War II, no one who uttered such a claim would have been considered a decent moral person. 

Nowadays, the words “I am offended” function more like what is called in philosophy a performative utterance.  In say the words, “I promise” a person thereby makes a promise.  She or he does not need to do some further thing.  The words “I am offended” are treated rather like that these days.  And the more emotion that attaches to the utterance “I am offended,” the more validity the utterance is taken to have.  So it should come as no surprise that the utterance “I am offended” has next to no credibility these days. 

This, in turn, brings us to one respect in which the idea of equality, as once conceived of a mere 40 years ago, is falling apart at the seams.  Veering towards equality is possible only if individuals have reason to take seriously charges of wrongdoing.  But individuals cannot have such a reason in a world in which “I am offended” need not have any basis in reality, save a person’s own idiosyncratic view of things.  I mean why not be offended over the fact that someone is taller than one is or more beautiful than one is or, perish the thought, smarter than one is. 

If being offended is something that one can just call, like a game, then there really is nothing that really precludes the absurdities that I have just mentioned.  This is one reason why Chancellor Nancy Cantor did so much damage in the way that she handled the Hill-TV fiasco.  The silliness of the few students involved was no more a reflection of campus values at-large than was her reaction.  Yet, the claim of being offended put forward by various individuals was predicated upon the idea that nearly any and every white person on the Syracuse University campus—except, of course, the Chancellor herself—resonated with silliness of the few students involved in the program. 

I am offended.  But then so what, since at this point in time being offended bears no correlation whatsoever to the reality of a wrong being committed. 

I am offended.  And part of what offends is that this cavalier use of the term “I am offended” violates a fundamental precept of justice.  But then that commits me to objectivity. 

A fundamental precept of justice is that we do not accuse people of wrongdoing unless they have actually committed a wrong and, moreover, whether or not this is so is not simply a function of how we feel.  Thus, if you are white and you tell me that you do not think that I have the talent to do philosophy, you are not on that account alone being racist. 

My favorite example in this regard comes from another culture.  In France, money for a purchase exchanges hands in the following way.  The buyer puts the amount of money owed on the counter; the cashier picks it up; places the change owed on the counter, and the buyer picks up the change.  An American black in this context who is unfamiliar with this cultural pattern might feel that this is an expression of subtle racism towards him.  He might be offended.  Alas, he would be wrong about the first and so would not be justified in being offended—his actual feelings notwithstanding.

The move away from objectivity comes with a very high price, namely that of a lack of accountability for the excoriating assessments that we make of others.  And where there is no moral accountability, human beings are in point of fact worse off.  For then we have a moral climate in which truth does not matter when it comes to the claims that we make about people.  And that is a context that is not conducive to mutual respect. 

So there you have it.  Time was when mutual respect was something of a global aim.  This was compatible with criticisms of others.  But those criticisms had to be grounded in reality, meaning that they had to be tied to an actual flaw.  One could not merely assert a flaw and then assert cultural privilege. 

Naturally, I understand that part of the impetus for the move away from objectivity is that objectivity often turned out to be no more than imposed prejudices and biases.  But the move from some claims of objectivity are specious to all claims of objectivity are specious is itself a most specious move. 

We cannot have it both ways.  The unvarnished truth is that idea of moral accountability is entirely bankrupt in the absence of moral objectivity.  Accordingly, the strategy of disposing of biases and prejudices by denouncing moral objectivity altogether has resulted in a mere Pyrrhic victory. 

So indeed there is a respect in which humanity is worse off today than it was a few decades ago, because in the final analysis moral accountability has been roundly rejected.  The very idea of supposing that there can be moral accountability without moral objectivity is rather like supposing that there can water without oxygen.  It is particularly disconcerting that moral objectivity has been discarded because in a world in which the number of ways in which we can wrong others is increasing exponentially, if there is one thing need more than ever it is profound sense of moral accountability. 

We once had it and we gave it up for expediency.  Alas, we are reaping what we have sown.  In a world without moral accountability, and so without moral objectivity, peace proves to be very elusive.  And so it is.