f we define rape as being forced to have sex against one’s will, then it will follow as a matter of logic that both women and men can be raped.  For an erection on the part of a man does not entail that he wants to have sex.  Indeed, it is perfectly possible for a man to have an erection and not want to have one; and it is perfectly possible for a man to be caused to have an erection against his will. 

A married man who is deeply committed to fidelity could be bound and then he caused to have an erection against his will by, for instance, fellatio.  A woman could do this to him.  A man could do this to him.  Then the man’s forced arousal could be used in other ways sexually.  For instance, a woman could then insert the man’s erect penis within her, as could a man.  Both could do so anally.  Rapes of this sort are no doubt no doubt rare, but that does not detract from the reality that they are possible.

The question, though, that I wish to consider is inspired by Jeremy Pierce's commentary, "The Male-Female Differential and Rape", upon an earlier blog-entry here: "Feminism and Moral Power".  I want to consider whether female rape and male rape are equally horrible.  Actually, that is not quite the question.  Rather, I want to consider whether (a) the horror of a woman being raped by a man is on a par with (b) the horror a man being raped by a woman.  This still leaves us with two other possibilities, namely (c) the horror a woman being raped by a woman and (d) the horror of a man being raped by a man. 

I shall assume without argument that, in terms of horror, (a) and (d) are close enough experientially.  I am not assuming, however, that both are equally likely.  What (a) and (d) have in common is not that the person has been aroused against her or his will (which may not be the case), but that the person has been penetrated against her or his will. 

So at the very least, then, we have two categories here: (i) Sex that is against one’s will and only that, which is what we have with (b) and (c).  (ii) Sex involving penetration that is against one’s will, which is what we have with (a) and (d).

Needless to say, making a person do something against his will is hardly trivial.  If you put a gun to my head and order to me spit on the ground, I can assure you that I shall do so.  And although spitting does not really deplete a resource of mine and is a relatively effortless thing to do, I can also assure you that doing so in this instance will hardly be a pleasant experience.  In fact, the experience will not be a pleasant one even if just seconds before I was contemplating spitting on the ground. 

The case of eating brings this out very nicely.  No matter how hungry I am and no matter how wonderful the meal I am going to eat is (the grandma special, say), being ordered to eat the prepared food at gunpoint puts an incredible damper on things. 

Some people are into water sports—that is, urinating upon one another is part of the sexual encounter and said to bring sexual excitment to the moment.  If, at gunpoint, two people forced me to urinate upon one of them because that would be the zenith of sexual excitement for the person, doing so would trouble me enormously, even if it were absolutely the case that I needed to relieve myself.  I do not want to have a memory of such an experience.  It would for me be a horrible memory to have, because I consider such a thing to be a disgusting act. 

So there can be no doubt about it: Being made to perform sexual acts that are simply against one’s will can be most disturbing.  But does penetration against one’s will make matters even worse?

The water sports example is instructive.  Suppose that two men approached me with a gun and utter “We intend to rape you.  Take off your pants”.  As I complied, one drops to the ground, with the other still pointing the gun at me and orders me to urinate upon him.  This, as it turns out, brings him to an orgasm.  It goes without saying that I shall be grateful that I did not suffer a worse fate.  As disgusting as I think it is to urinate upon someone and as problematic as it is for me that someone finds that sexually exciting, it is a very long ways from being penetrated.  I deliberately refrained from telling the story, where we have a woman being the person ordered at gunpoint.  I assume, though, that a woman would also have the thought that being forced to urinate upon someone is a very long ways from being penetrated. 

When it comes to being forced to do things against one’s will, there are degrees of badness.  If you should, at gunpoint, force me to spit on the ground, the coercion here is bad.  It is clearly worse, though, if you should force me to spit in someone else’s face. 

The very nature of sexual penetration against a person’s will is that the perpetrator shows enormous indifference to the person’s well-being; for the person is indifferent to the trauma (physical and psychological) that is occasioned on account of the penetration alone.  In general, there is trauma that is associated with being forced to do anything against one’s will.  Being penetrated raises beyond measure the level of that trauma.  Consider for instance that "Let me penetrate you and I will not hurt you" is simply not even close to being on a par with "Urinate on me and I will not hurt you".  This is true, athough we have coercion in each instance; for although we have coercion in each instance, clearly one form of coercion is preferable to others.  Remember that even Dante thought that there were levels of hell.   

When a person is forced at gunpoint to do things, it is never trivial that he or she will not be raped.  Any number of people might be disgusted at being coerced to urinate upon a person in order to occasion sexual pleasure on the part of the individual in question.  Still, any such coerced person would be grateful that the coercion did not involve having to submit penetration.  The very nature of penetration in the case of rape is that it involves not having a concern about the person, although the act of penetration itself makes such a concern most appropriate.  

That is, penetration is as it should be only if there is the proper intent and their can be the proper intent only if there is proper regard for the other.  Rape involving penetration is a more flagrant absence of this regard than all other cases of rape.  With a male who is tied up and then brought to an erection against his will, part of the problem lies in the fact that he is tied up against one's will.   

It is comparatively rare for a woman to be interested in penetrating a man either a man or a woman (using various objects).   There is no logical impossibility here, though.  Yet, I suspect that it is rather unlikely that women in general should turn to have this preference.

So where does the discussion leave us?  Numerous are the ways in which a person can be made to act against her or his will.  And these are not all on the same moral plane.  Rape is not the exception to this latter claim, though rhetorically people often speak as if rape does not admit of a continuum.

Thus, to Pierce’s concern, my view is this.  An erection notwithstanding, the rape of a man by a woman is possible and is wrong.  For having an erection is not thereby a sign that the man wants to have sex with the person.  Men have as much of a right to what they do with their bodies, with or without an erection, as do women.  The issue, though, was whether or not there is something about the rape of a woman by a man that makes matters worse.  The answer is an affirmative one.  Notice, though, that the way in which the rape of a woman is worse when the rapist is a man is analogous the way in which the rape of a man is worse when the rapist is a man, namely with the issue of penetration.  And to the extent that the behavior approaches penetration (by using various objects) when a woman rapes a man or another women, we have to that extent the horror that is associated with male rapists, where the defining character of that horror is being subjected to (the attempt at) penetration.  And it is no accident that rape involving penetration is seen as the paradigm kind of rape horror. 

Finally, the argument of the earlier blog spoke to importance of consent.  A slight revision is in order then.  Between both women and men consent is obviously de rigeur.  However, insofar as sex between women and men characteristically involve vaginal penetration, the consent of women has an importance to it that generally has no analogue in the case of men. 

The nature of touch is of fundamental importance in human action.  Penetration without consent leaves no room taking the victim to have thought that she or he is being taken seriously.  Other forms of sexual coercion do.  One can in fact forcibly tie a person up all the while making it manifestly clear to the individual that one will not otherise harm her or him.  To force penetration upon a person is already to make it clear that all bets are off.

It is rather unlikely that I have addressed all of Pierce's concerns.  My hope for the moment that discussion has moved forward a bit.  Philosophers are fond of coming up with fantastic cases in order to make a point.  I have resisted that temptation here.  For the record, I did not mention pregnancy precisely because I do not think that the horror of rape turns upon the possibility that a woman might be pregnant.  Certainly, no one would suggests that rape involving penetration is less horrofic for a woman because she is on birth control or because she is sterile.  For the point about intentions to which I have drawn attention does not disappear under these circumstances.

Finally, part of what Pierce is talking about is redefining manhood.  Appearance to the contrary notwithstandig, men are not always ready for sex.  Alas, in a culture that affixes sexual innuendo to just about anything, be it driving a car or drinking milk, it often takes quite a man to admit such a thing.