o what is wrong with sex in public spaces?  We all know that people have sex and we all know that there is nothing at all immoral about sex per se.  Surely the moral status of the sex act does not change if the event between mutually consenting adults takes place in public rather than in private.  I am not thinking of discrete locations away from the public eye—a wooded area that affords complete privacy.  No, I am thinking about sex in plain view: in Time Square, on public transportation, and so on.  People sleep in all of these places.  Why isn’t it, then, that wherever people can sleep in public they can also have sex in public? 

This entry is occasion by “Masturbation: The Horror”, which offers some reflections on masturbating in public.  However, I shall primarily address the issue of sex between people in public. 

So what’s wrong with sex in public?  When people sleep in public, we typically leave them alone.  If the person has chosen a discrete spot for sleeping and we stumble upon the person, we are typically quiet and leave the individual alone.  And if a person falls asleep in the middle of Time Square, we are apt to be impressed that the individual could manage so much tranquility in the midst of so much chaos and noise.  In any case, though, we get on with our business.  In the typical case, we do not disturb the individual unless there is impending harm. 

So why isn’t sex like that?  If two people choose Time Square, we are rather impressed that they can get it on right there.  In the absence of impending harm, though, we would not disturb them and continue with our business.   

Interestingly, much of what I have said about sex can be said about defecation.  Yet, I doubt if anyone is advocating that.  Is this owing to sanitary considerations?  I mean couldn’t we just have toilet paper stands and flush buckets conveniently distributed throughout?  Persons would need only to place themselves adjacent to one of these public facilities, and then get on with defecating.  This is so much cheaper.  And defecation, like sex, is a part of life.  Indeed, more so.  There is no opting out of defecation for the sake of a higher moral calling.  Nor is age ever a relevant factor. 

Is prudishness alone the explanation for why we generally do defecate or have sex in public?  No doubt that may be part of it.  But I think that there is much more. 

A fundamental part of the explanation, I believe, has to do with our conception of privacy.  That explanation may have had its origins in concerns pertaining to prudishness, but over time considerations of privacy have come to have a life of their own.  As an aside, an independent reason for not having sex in public is that the behavior would be observed by children would do not at a very young age have the psychological wherewithal to interpret properly all the sounds and behavior that are characteristic of sex.  However, shall leave this potent consideration aside. 

Privacy is about two things that operate in tandem: what others have access to without seeking permission and what people can offer to others without seeking permission.  We use privacy in Western culture to mark degrees of intimacy (from friendship to romantic).  This can be seen with something as innocuous as eating habits.  If you offer me something off your plate, from which you have already been eating, that is apt to be an indication of closeness between us; otherwise, I am likely to think that what you did was rather inappropriate.  Likewise, I am apt to seek permission before I take something from your plate.  But only if, in the first place, I have the right kind of relationship with you.  Lovers pick from one another’s plates without thinking.  But then, lovers share a particularly high degree of intimacy. 

In Western culture, we think that sex is an intensely private matter.  It is not just about what people do between themselves.  It is also about the limits that people should have with regard to what they do before others.   So even if two people are more than willing to “go at it” in public, others should not have to contend with witnessing this intimate act.  This shall become more evident in the context of self-disclosure below.

One can hold this view without in any way being a prude about sex.  There need not be even a hint of shame involved here.  No doubt part of the explanation for this is that sex is rather unlike many other activities, in that sexual desire once aroused can be rather intrusive; and few things arouse sexual desire like witnessing the act before one’s very eyes.  For instance, suppose that I am away from my spouse owing to professional traveling.  So, as a healthy person, witnessing two people having sex right before my very eyes or on the floor in the restaurant, on the elevator of all places, is apt to occasion some very intense sexual desires that I had otherwise been able to keep in check.  Thus, witnessing sex is rather unlike witnessing someone downing a pint of whisky—unless one is an alcoholic.  But then by definition an alcoholic has a drinking problem.  A healthy sexual appetite is not as such a problem. 

Another reason why sex has become such a matter of privacy is that in Western culture personal ties are so freely formed.  In particular, arranged marriages are all but non-existent.  Given that sex is taken as part of the marriage package, arranged marriages turn sex into something that is required of one as opposed to something about which one—and no one else but one—makes the choice.  With arranged marriages, sex is first an obligation and then, if all goes well, a form of personal expression fulfillment.  In Western culture, sex has evolved into a quintessential form of personal expression and fulfillment. 

Designated public areas for sex do not present a problem for privacy as I am understanding it.  Such areas would be rather like going into a porn theater.  In both cases, one knows from the very outset what to expect.  People often go to porno theatres precisely because they are interested in being aroused by witnessing (in some fashion or the other) sex before their very eyes.

As an aside, it is worth noting that cultures that have a less private conception of the body also seem to be vastly more ritualistic, where the rituals regulate just about every aspect of life. 

At this juncture, I want to look at sex in public spaces from the standpoint of self-disclosure.  Suppose that two people were to vividly recount to me their sexual experience last night.  Needless to say, that would be way more information than I would want to know; and I can assure you that I would inform of this.  In fact, I would probably stop them at the outset.  It is worth pointing out here that people can be willing to do what is in fact inappropriate to do.  Self-disclosure is not appropriate merely because a person want to do so.  It is perfectly possible to regret having said one voluntarily and freely self-disclosed precisely because one later realizes how inappropriate the self-disclosure was.   

It is often supposed that if no one is in any way harmed by an activity, then there is nothing wrong with engaging in it.  But that is not quite right, as the above example of self-disclosure reveals.  To be sure, we do not have a moral wrong in the example.  But the absence of a moral wrong does not preclude the behavior—the self-disclosure, in this case—from being highly inappropriate.  Suppose that I should ask a nun (who is visibly dressed as such) to have a sexual tryst with me.  She declines; and I fully respect her decision.  Nothing morally wrong has transpired.  No one has been harmed.  Yet, my behavior merits considerable disapproval on the grounds that it is quite inappropriate.

Sex between two people is a form of self-disclosure between them, even if it is a one-night stand.  Sex between them in public space is a form of self-disclosure between them and, moreover, between them and others.  And I maintain that the character of that self-disclosure is inappropriate in the public realm, in precisely the way that a vivid account from my friends of their sexual encounter last night is inappropriate. 

In having sex, we share with our sexual partner things that we should not share with other individuals.  And sex in public undermines that very fundamental distinction between the couple participating in the sex act and others.  It would amount to conveying information to people that they would just as soon not have given to them—information that they would be better off not knowing.  Nothing good comes from knowing that Susie looks like she is bored out of her mind though Jack thinks (and, moreover, thinks that Susie thinks) that he is the Don Juan of the moment.  Or perhaps, she is under the delusion that she is performing like the Vixen that Jack always wanted.  But we can see nothing of the sort is true.  More than likely, witnessing two people have sex is apt to tell us much about their personal interactions to which we should not be privy; and the two people involved ought to feel the same way.  Necessarily, sex is a form of communication between two people.  That everyone participates in this form of communication does not itself constitute a reason why it should simply be private.  Lovers also say "I love you" to one another.  Yet, only a fool would think privacy is irrelevant to that utterance. 

The preceding remarks apply equally to masturbating in public, which we may liken to talking out loud in public.  A most important conversation with oneself at home is one thing.  That very same conversation with oneself in public would be inappropriate because one is disclosing things that one ought not disclose.  And a very clear indication that a person does not take himself sufficiently seriously is just the fact that the individual discloses way too much about himself.  Masturbation is not simply the elimination of a bit of bodily fluid.  It is one of the forms that the embodiment of sexual fantasy takes, with all that this involves in terms of sounds and bodily movements.  Necessarily, this is the description under which it would be witnessed in public.  Being unmindful of this bespeaks a profound level of immaturity.  For the record, none of this requires holding a Puritanical conception of masturbation, according to which it constitutes the sin of onanism.   

Of course, we could trivialize sex in fundamental ways.  That is, we could make it rather like sharing a piece of bread.  With rare exception, sharing a piece of bread occasions very little self-disclosure.  I make no predictions with regard to whether sex shall ever be like sharing a piece of bread.  What I do know, however, is that it would be a very, very different world if it were.  And it is far from clear that it would be preferable to the present one. 

In effect, I have argued that sex has a certain ontological status in Western culture, which makes sex in public inappropriate.  Undoubtedly, the springboard for that ontological status was a certain prudish mentality regarding sex.  But an explanation for not having sex in public can be given that has nothing whatsoever to do with being prudish about sex.  The ontological status of sex may change.  But its status most certainly will not change without a change in other things.  For instance, if folks in Western culture became much more robotic in their behavior, then sex would most certainly become more zombie like; and zombie like sex might not be much different from exchanging bread (except for intensity).  Indeed, the choice between extra slices of bread and sex might very well be a choice between things that are commensurate.  Nothing of the sort is true now. 

In the meantime, those of us who think sex in public is rather inappropriate need not suppose that we are haunted by the ghost of an outdated view of sex.  Quite the contrary, our opposition can be tied to the vivacity and meaningfulness of sex at its best—namely, sex as it is experienced in the fullness of the flesh and so that which is far from being a form of immature prudishness. 

nce upon a time, there was an organization called the ACLU that was like an insatiable lion regarding the matter of free speech.  Nothing uttered was deemed too offense to warrant prohibiting (given the absence of an imminent threat).  That organization was relentless, or nearly so, in the protection of free speech.  But the old ACLU has become something new: the Monetarily Expedient ACLU.  Or for short: The ME-ACLU.

According to the old ACLU if a student wants to wear a t-shirt to school with the words “Fuck Me” written on it: the ACLU would be to the rescue.  Wearing that T-shirt, so the ACLU would claim, is protected by free speech.  True, it seems that whether the ACLU deems something a threat or not is anything but straightforward.  So wearing a t-shirt to school with the words “Jesus Loves You” on it might be deemed by the ACLU as a threat to gays or Muslims or whomever.  Or, at any rate, the ACLU could be slow to defend this sort of thing.  But as I find myself saying often on this blog site: we mustn’t be small-minded in our consistency.

At any rate, nothing could have prepared me for the story that was reported in the New York Times entitled “”ACLU May Block Criticism by Board” (24 May 2006).  Indeed, my initial thought was that the headlines have to be misleading; for surely the ACLU would never ever stifle free speech that amounts to more than criticism—certainly not for expediency’s sake alone.  Not the venerable champion of free speech ! ! !  But I could not have been more wrong.

The New York Times gives us the following quote from the ACLU:

Directors should remember that there is always a material prospect that public airing of disagreement will affect that A. C. L.U. in terms of public support and fund-raising” 

In other words, freedom of speech is fine except when it interferes with the ACLU’s fund raising efforts.  I have never supposed that ruthless consistency is a virtue, precisely because life is too complicated for there not to be exceptions, however rare they might be.  Normally, though, the exception is tied to yet another fundamental principle.  And that is where the ACLU’s new stance against criticism by its positions by its own officers can only be regarded as utterly despicable.  For its restraint on freedom of speech comes, not from a fundamental moral principle, but from none other than the concern to enhance monetary support.  If this isn’t untenable expediency on the part of the ACLU, then I do not know what is.

        There is in the English language a word for this move on the part of the ACLU: hypocrisy. So we what have now is the Monetarily Expedient ACLU (the ME-ACLU)

Let me offer what is called in moral philosophy a meta-principle (that is a moral principle regarding moral principles):

Departure from a fundamental moral principle should never ever be driven primarily by self-interested concerns; and this should generally be manifestly so; hence, in departing from a fundamental moral principle, it should be evident to any objective observer that one’s primary motives were not self-interested. 

The foregoing meta-principle explains why infidelity is invariably inexcusable.  For in the typical case, the unfaithful person is motivated primarily by self-interested reasons.  By contrast, the classic example of lying to save a stranger’s from death at the hands of the Nazis is an act that garners our admiration precisely because the motivation here is clearly not self-interested. 

          Needless to say, the position of the Monetarily Expedient ACLU (or what I call the ME-ACLU) is an unequivocal violation of the meta-principle given in the preceding paragraph.  But it is actually even worse than that.

          Criticism from well-placed officials within the ACLU helps observers to reflect better upon the policies adopted by the ACLU; for the fact that a well-placed ACLU official takes exception to an ACLU policy or stands signals quite clearly that there are important questions about the policy that can be raised. 

Time was when it seemed that the ACLU sought to be a modern-day realization of Mill’s conception of free speech.  Thus, on this view, the old ACLU embraced criticism from within precisely because those on the inside were often, albeit not necessarily, in the position to offer the most salient criticism. 

I had my criticisms of the old ACLU.  But I did like its spirit.  The ACLU was a veritable battleship in the rough waters of democratic life.  It stood for something, and that something could not be ignored, even when one disagreed with the particular application of the ACLU’s view of things; for we can respect those with whom we disagree.  But that organization seems to have died.  The ME-ACLU (that is, the Monetarily Expedient ACLU) is but an imposter. 

Quite simply, it is not possible to silence criticism for the sake of enhancing one’s funds, and stand for anything of moral value.  That is rather like accepting money for sex all the while insisting that one is not a prostitute.  Not an option.

Monday’s blog entry touched upon the issue of the absence of foresight being an aspect of democracy.  The ACLU’s new position is an absence of foresight moment if ever there was one, as nothing could be more shortsighted than announcing publicly that one is sacrificing free speech for monetary gain. 

True, the organization gets some credit for going public with its new position.  But this ought to have been a moment of insight regarding the untenable character of the new position.  The virtue of self-examination lies not merely in our seeing what we need to change, but in our making (at least some of) the changes revealed to us by insight.  ACLU’s proposed policy is so inimical to the principles that were until now such a constitutive part of its identity that one has to wonder how it could embrace this new policy without experiencing some form of disintegration—nay, self-destruction—from within. 

We must remember, though, that Tocqueville held that shortsightedness was a national characteristic of the American democracy.  If this is right, then the ME-ACLU has very little to worry about.  For its own shortsightedness will be heartily met by the shortsightedness of the American people in general. 

The position of the ME-ACLU ought to occasion moral outrage.  Thus, I would that I were a member of the ACLU; for as an expression of my moral outrage, I would have terminated my membership with all due speed. 

Nothing more quickly turns morality into immorality than putting "me" first.  The new Me-ACLU (that is the Monetarily Exedient ACLU) will not be the exception to this truth.

emocracy is generally held to be a most significant political advance over Aristocracy.  This is especially so in view of the simple truth that at its most profound level the idea behind aristocracy is nothing more than a myth, as there is no bloodline that renders one group of human beings superior to others, to say nothing of being fit to rule others.  One of the most alluring features of democracy is just the fact that it allows in principle that any member of society is capable of exhibiting extraordinary excellence in every walk of life. 

The genius of Alex de Tocqueville lies in the fact that he saw drawbacks to democracy more than 200 years ago that seem quite applicable today.  In just a few pages in Democracy in America (II, Part III, Chapter 19), Tocqueville proved to be brilliantly insightful about an important problem with democracy.  He recognized that the ideal of equality can be employed or insisted upon to a fault.  And indeed we are finding just that in our public schools. 

Many public schools now downplay that idea of the gifted student.  This they do in the name of not offending anyone.  Indeed, it seems that the very idea of the public school is defined these days in terms of teaching to the lowest common denominator, making a virtue out of stupidity.  The irony here is that by the time we finish not leaving any child behind there is a real sense in which we have left just about every child behind.  Or, in any case, we have done more harm than good, as we have ignored the gifted in the name of being supportive of those lacking in talent. 

Time was when gifted students were much admired for their imagination and creativity.  It was not considered an embarrassment that one was not gifted, precisely because it was fully understood that being gifted meant that one exceeded reasonable expectations.  Accordingly, a student who had no difficulty measuring up to reasonable expectations fully grasped that she or he was doing just fine.  There were no self-esteem problems.

But nowadays, it is supposed that acknowledging differences in intellectual abilities is none other than the harbinger of low self-esteem.  Democracy has resulted in a slide from the tenable and true thesis that all are morally equal to the untenable and false thesis that all are intellectually equal. 

To be sure, injustices of various forms have in some instances been an impediment to our recognizing the talent of various individuals.  But needless to say, the solution to this injustice was not to declare all members of an oppressed group as gifted.  After all, no one believes that—including members of oppressed groups.  There is all the difference in the world between holding, on the one hand, that Native American culture (for example) is richer than had been supposed and holding, on the other, that anything any Native American does or says is breathtakingly brilliant. 

This brings me to another insight that Tocqueville had about democracy, namely that it cultivates short-sightedness: people are so concerned with immediate satisfaction that they give next to no thought to long-range plans.  Credit card debt in America is a prime example of this.  It is no accident that we distinguish between credit card debt and mortgage debt.  The former is typically indefensible and speaks only to the moment; whereas the latter is a debt that secures one’s future well-being.  That is all the difference in the world.

It goes without saying that companies prey upon short-sightedness.  Mere options are made to feel like needs.  Does anyone really need a new ringtone each month for a far from nominal fee? 

But perhaps the more pernicious form of short-sightedness lies with social advancement itself.  We are pushing equality in ways that borders on absurdity.  I have two interesting examples regarding toilet facilities.  One involves the concern we find at some universities with regard to having toilet facilities for transgendered folks.  To the best of my knowledge: (a) toilet facilities (for use by several people at once) observe the penis-vagina difference and (b) the point of such facilities is to relieve oneself.  They are not really about how one feels on the inside.  At a very practical level, it is irrelevant that a woman feels like a man or a man feels like a woman. 

There are, in fact, some moments of being uncomfortable that are simply a part of life.  I am uncomfortable whenever there is more than one person in a public restroom.  Depending on the size of the facilities and the degree of urgency, I have walked out and waited for a less busy moment.   

And we do not need to know whether a person is transgendered or not, any more than we need to know whether a person is gay or straight or not (whatever ‘not’ means in this instance).  Toilet facilities should not be the place for self-discovery with regard to sexual identity.  And only a rather perverse view of equality could make it so.

The second example pertains to the distribution of public toilets on the streets that took place in New York City (an enclosed single person facility the automatically cleaned itself after each use).  Several organizations for handicap people complained that these toilets did not accommodate handicap people, with the result being that all the toilets were removed.  The thought obviously was that either all should have the advantage of toilets on the streets or none should have it. 

Now, the proof that this was more political posturing rather than a genuine social reality is that to date many, many airplanes are not equipped with handicap facilities.  In this case, no one thinks that either there should be facilities for all or for none.  That would be absurd.  But this tells us what we already know, namely that sometimes we need to bow to practical considerations.  We do this with regard to swings in the park, as there are no special swings for wheel-chair bound individuals. 

This gets to the very heart of Tocqueville’s point, namely that democracy seems not to be able to acknowledge differences between people without supposing that a moral difference is thereby being invoked, however subtlety.    

The final example that I shall give pertains to the importance now attributed to standardized tests.  These came about as a result of inflated letters of recommendation which, in turn, came about as a result of the concern to avoid comparisons between students.  One deadly consequence of this is that we now have in place a system that makes it so much harder for idiosyncratic excellences to be acknowledge, though we know that test scores alone are not a very good measure of the excellences that a person will accomplish in life.  In the name of equality, then, we are thwarting excellence.   In the meanwhile, shows like “American Idol” are a runaway success.  This tells us something very important, which is that there is no substitute for the affirmation of success earned the old fashion way, namely through fierce competition. 

Aristocracy decided in advance, as it were, who would succeed—even who was worthy of succeeding.  Democracy’s revolutionary contribution is supposed to lie in giving everyone the chance to be the best that she or he could be, without prejudging anyone in advance.  Democracy’s failure, as Tocqueville grasped, lies in mistakenly thinking that we must treat everyone in exactly the same way in order to give everyone a chance.  This effectively takes away from democracy its greatest gift, namely individuality.  And this, we have become too short-sighted to see.

n my way to Europe recently, I had a most remarkable conversation with a rabid Anti-Semite.  The man, let us call him John, is as unabashedly antisemitic as I am a frequent traveler.  The conversation took place in Newark Liberty International Airport while we were both waiting for our respective flights to Europe (Brussels for him; Paris for me).  There is, of course, no such thing as a rabid antisemitic look.  But whatever profile I might have had in mind, John most certainly did not fit it.  Casually dressed with his baseball hat on, and not a tattoo or piercing in site, John is a white man who had been married to a black woman.  He plays blues as a hobby; and he is a masterfully articulate and clever person.  Moreover, he is quite a keen observer.

On the flight from Syracuse to Newark, he had heard me mention that I forgotten some medication.  And as I passed the gate where he was waiting around for his flight to Brussels, he struck up a conversation with me by inquiring as to how I had resolved the problem of the medication that I had forgotten.  What a cordial beginning.

have heard it said that blacks cannot be racist.  I have heard this thesis advanced by blacks with the conviction that is appropriate only for a manifestly obvious self-evident truth such as the claim that “Newborn Infants need protection and care; otherwise, they will die”.  Everything anyone has ever experienced in the world confirms the truth of this statement about newborns.  But the very idea that blacks cannot be racist seems radically counterintuitive from the outset.  I shall end this essay on a provocative note by talking about moral healing and systematic child sexual abuse.

Now, no one in her or his right mind thinks that blacks cannot be biased or that blacks cannot hold distorted views about non-blacks or, for that matter, even about blacks.  Surely the thought on the part of blacks cannot possibly be that everything that blacks believe about themselves or others is true.  If that isn’t turning self-love (or whatever the parallel to a group might be) into a vice, then I do not know what is.  No one has a monopoly on truth regardless of the topic.

Still, many blacks are utterly convinced that blacks cannot be racist.  And that cries out for an explanation. 

The typical case of racism is that of believing without justification or reasonable warrant that a people are inferior, whether the inferiority be intellectual or moral.  And, of course, we know that racism against blacks is tied to this belief about black inferiority. 

Does this much shed any light on why blacks think that they cannot be racist?  Perhaps.  The thought, I suppose, is that blacks most certainly cannot be racist towards whites.  And the thought here might be that there has never been any of the social machinery in place to deliver this conclusion about whites by blacks.  And if whites have been racist, then the belief that whites are racist is a belief that is not without reasonable warrant. 

But the most that this shows is not that blacks cannot be racist at all, but something much more limited, namely that certain feelings of hostility on the part of blacks towards whites do not in any way have a racist underpinning.  But, alas, this victory is more hollow than is supposed. 

Why?  Because feelings of hostility towards an individual can be most objectionable morally, although these feelings have nothing whatsoever to do with viewing the individual as inferior.  Jealousy, for instance, can occasion sustained feelings of hostility without there being the least thought that the person who is the object of the jealousy is in someway inferior. 

Evil is not exhausted by racism.  My soul can be free of racism, but full of greed, jealousy, cruelty and vindictiveness.  And if these four traits consume my soul, then I am a pretty horrible person.  That I am a horrible person towards everyone is not exactly a reason to take pride in myself.  Far from it.

In other words: The absence of racism on the part of blacks, if indeed that is the case, most certainly does not entail the presence of virtue in general on the part of blacks.  More generally, the truth that one is not racist does not thereby warrant a claim to moral superiority on one’s part. 

Racism is a very complex phenomenon.  And the truth of the matter is that one can be racist but generous, and not racist but utterly greedy.  It is easy to miss this because we associate racism with cruelty.  But the belief in the intellectual inferiority of a people, as was often the case with blacks, is quite compatible with being generous towards that very same group.   By contrast, a host of other vices often require that the people in question are not inferior in the relevant way.  It takes an unusual story to talk about being jealous of the village idiot (merely as idiot) or the hideous looking person (merely for being hideous appearance). 

Thus far, I have pointed out that even if given the history of social development blacks are not apt to be racist towards whites, this is nonetheless compatible with blacks having a host of despicable attitude towards whites, none of which are rendered more palpable merely because blacks are not racist.  Truth be told, I might in fact prefer that a person be racist than that the individual should make me an object of his unbridled greed, vindictiveness, and jealousy. 

In any case, what is interesting is that there is no reason whatsoever to think that blacks cannot be racist towards non-whites: Asians or Native Americans or Latinos.  That is, even if it is true, for historical reasons, that blacks are not likely to be racist towards whites, this truth does not entail that blacks are just as unlikely to be racist towards other groups. 

It is simply a myth that if one is a victim of racism, then one is on that account alone free of all racism.  Blacks have held this thought and Jews have held this thought.  It is an absolutely untenable thought in either case.  This amounts to none other than a form of self-righteousness with respect to not being racist. 

Let me clear here.  I think that one can have impeccable reasons for believing that one is not racist, just as one can have impeccable reasons for believing that one is kind or talented.  But that impeccable reason with regard to the first is not the truth that one is or was a victim of racism.  It is an incontrovertible truth that victims of wrongdoing can see though quite tarnished lenses.  For instance, the female victim of rape who now thinks that all men are would-be rapist simply has gotten it wrong.  This holds even if she is right in thinking that all men remain sexist.  For a man’s sexism can take a form that is far removed from rape. 

Alas, what often gets in the way of seeing the world in the right way is just the fact that we have been so scarred.  Consider the following truth: people who have been victims of systematic child sexual abuse never get it quite right in the absence of considerable psychological help.  They will often have issues with true throughout their lives.

Why would anyone think that things would be any different when it comes to having experienced sustained social injustice of a very egregious kind?  In the typical case, being the victim of extreme wrongdoing makes it very, very difficult for a healthy self-concept to gain traction once again in one’s life.  This truth points to why those who in fact surmount such wrongdoing have a near invincible sense of self (not to be confused with arrogant sense of self). 

So I shall conclude with something of a dilemma: For any minority group who claims that they cannot be racist, I hold the following: Either they are (a) more psychologically scarred than they might ever be able to acknowledge in the absence of some form of social therapy or (b) utterly vicious individuals using the charge of racism for purposes of self-aggrandizement and silencing others.  If the latter, it does not matter that they cannot be racist; for they are already wicked enough. 

t is perhaps a very good thing that I am not God.  For if I were, there would be some serious changes here on earth.  I am afraid that there would be a sharp decline in the population, at least momentarily, until people got their act together about some things.  No, I would not impose the agenda of the religious right.  Indeed, it is far from obvious to me that the religious right is the best representative of God’s will.  In fact, if I were God my very problem would be that I would find the religious right a tad too sanctimonious. 

For instance, it seems to me that the doom-and-gloom approach to religion just has to be offensive to a God of righteousness, as this effectively turns God into little more than a coercive monster: “Do this and that or I will kick you ass”.  Just as this is surely no way to be a good parent, it seems to me that this is no way to be a God of righteousness.