Google
View Article  To Meddle or Not to Meddle: Friendship and Marriage

H

eling others is no doubt an absolutely wonderful thing.  But even here I am reminded of the wisdom of Solomon “To everything there is a season”.  And in no context does the wisdom of Solomon strike me as more applicable than with friends who are romantically involved.  There is no relationship more sacrosanct than a romantic one.  A romantic relationship can exhibit the tranquility of bucolic lake.  Or, such a relationship can exhibit the violence a tsunami.  And nothing more quickly turns the first into the second than interference from a third-party—even a third party who is a very close friend.

 

One starts with the quite simple observation that lovers have a possessiveness with regard to one another that has no equal in life—a possessiveness that constantly and forever in play.  One reason for this is that the relationship is affirmed only by the behavior that the two parties display towards one another, which makes it quite unlike biological ties.  These are easy.  Nothing ever alters them even if they are far from being salubrious. 

 

Romance is not a biological tie; and nothing will make it so.  Yet, romance is often said to supersede biological ties.  Thus, we find in the biblical text the following words:

 

Therefore shall a man leave his father and mother, and shall cleave unto his wife: and they shall be one flesh (Genesis 2:24-5)

 

This passage is typically thought to imply that the marital relationship takes precedent over the parental one.  And nothing will affirm that this has happened between a wife and a man like the behavior on the part of each other.  In this regard, there is no relationship that is more weighty than a marital one.  It is this truth that is my point of departure and that is central to my view regarding helping friends. 

 

So on my view a friend can interfere in a marital relationship when the following is true: (1) When there is a clear instance of deception taking place with regard to fidelity, then it is morally obligated on the part of the friend to inform the partner who is being deceived.  (2) If there is clear and eminently wrong moral behavior taking place (such as child sexual abuse), then it is morally obligatory to inform the other spouse.  In both cases, one should be able to provide unequivocal support of one's claim.  Reporting hearsay is rather like blowing stale air into a person's face. 

 

Interestingly, what one never ever mentions is inappropriate behavior on the part of one spouse that the other spouse cannot help but know.  For instance, if Mary and John are married and John regularly drinks a lot, then the odds are that Mary already knows this.  For it is exceedingly difficult to drink a lot regularly and this not show in some way or the other. 

 

Here is even a better example.  Using the names Mary and John again, suppose that Mary wears her clothes so tight that all sorts of things regarding her body are outlined.  Nothing would be more foolish than to comment upon this.  After all, John most certainly knows this.  I mean how could he not know?

 

Good friends can stand by one another and are there for one another in quite dramatic ways.  As the saying goes, they can have one another’s back.  But when one of the friends becomes romantically involved, the can no longer stand by the friend and be there for him in the same way.  The romance changes everything.

 

Friendships and romance occasion deep compartmentalizing.  Lines in the sand get drawn and nothing is more important to the health of those ties on all accounts than that those lines simply do not get crossed.  So one knows and simply does not say what one knows.  Even better: One does not even let on that one knows.  No commenting that John drinks a lot; no commenting that Mary wears her clothes way too tight.  Nay, it is as if these things do not happen at all. 

 

What makes all of this so fascinating, if I have things right, is that companion friendships and marriages tend to be more like separate courses, placed on separate plates, of a large meal, than two items that marvelously go together on the same plate.  The good that companion friends do for one another cannot be what they should continue to do for one another when one of them gets married. 

To be sure, there are lots and lots of wonderful things that good friends can do for one another when one of them is married.  However, this is so only if the priority of the marriage is roundly affirmed by the friend who is not married. 

 

Most of the helping that we do presupposes rather limited knowledge regarding the details of a person’s life.  We lend a helping hand if a person falls or drops things or in public loses something vital.  And so on.  We do not need to know much in order to see that this needs to be done and in order to provide some help in this regard.

 

Friends, however, help in quite intimate ways—ways that go far beyond helping a person who has fallen, say.  This fact points to why romance and friendship mark a significant change. 

 

For when a romance or marriage is as it should be, its level of intimacy takes priority over the intimacy of a friendship; and this is something that a friend must acknowledge. 

 

The irony here is that this would not have been true in Aristotle’s day when women were inferior to men in moral and social status.  But in a world in which all are equal in moral and social status, friendship must of necessity move to a lower rung out respect for romance and marriage.  Notice that while a married friend can go to his friend for counsel, it is very, very, very rare that the friend can say to the married one "I need to offer you some advice about your marriage".

View Article  After Wrongdoing: Victimhood versus Flourishing

T

here is much to be said for the view that persons with self-respect do not tolerate being treated wrongly.  Indeed, this is a view to which I mightily subscribe.  Unfortunately, there is a very distorted and perverted way of understanding this view; and it is that very distorted and perverted rendering that has become increasingly popular in recent years.  Why, to hear some people tell it having self-respect consists in wallowing in the fact that one has been a victim; and on this view, doing nothing to help oneself is deemed justified because doing something to help oneself is somehow interpreted as a negation of one’s victim’s status.

 

On the warped view of not tolerating wrongdoing, blaming others for having been wronged is seen as an irrefutable sign of having self-respect—an undeniable affirmation of one’s moral personhood.  So people almost rush nowadays to obtain victim status.  Indeed, we have come dangerously close to making being a victim a sort of performative utterance, whereby all it takes to be a victim is simply that one declares that one is. 

 

Here is an example cut from the cloth of reality.  Several years ago I announced to my 400-student class that two students have been caught cheating.  Well, guess what?  They claimed to be victims.  In what way were they victims?  Well, so the story goes, I had “outed” them as cheaters.  You will quite naturally wonder whether I had unwittingly mentioned their names or described them in sufficient detail that one could infer who they were.  In two words, the answer is: Absolutely not. 

 

Anyone who could have inferred from what I actually wrote who the two cheaters were would have exhibited a measure of serendipity that one would have thought was reserved only for the gods.

 

Nowadays, it would seem that people are more creative in finding ways to be a victim than they are in doing anything remotely excellent.

 

But it is the wallowing in victimhood that intrigues me.  Why is victim status preferable to the status that is exemplified by having enormous moral resolve and courage? 

 

The answer, I think, is a simple one, namely that victim status is a quick emotional fix—a palliative that quickly allows one to claim some sort of victory.  Victim status allows for outbursts of rage and anger.  It allows for searing criticisms of one’s wrongdoers.  And, above all, it allows one to drench oneself in the well of self-pity, thereby excusing one of all responsibility.  What a relief ! ! !

 

There is no doubt something to be said for flights of irresponsibility, provided that they come in very infrequent nanoseconds.  As a way of living, however, irresponsibility is absolutely and unequivocally self-defeating. 

 

This brings me back to the beginning of this blog-entry.  If anything is true, it is true that self-respect is not in any way about being irresponsible for one’s life.  Indeed, it is not possible to have self-respect without being deeply, deeply committed to excellence in one’s life—to doing the very best that one can under the circumstances.  This tells me something very poignant, namely that a whole lot of people who claim to have self-respect do not at all have it. 

 

It is one thing to hold others to blame for the wrong that they did; it is quite another to become obsessed with accusing those individuals of having committed the wrong.  The first is compatible with having self-respect.  Indeed, self-respect may even require it.  However, having self-respect is incompatible with the second.  The victim mentality that is prevalent nowadays slides from the first to the second; and this second alternative is none other than a path to self-destruction. 

 

The second approach makes blaming others more important than self-advancement.  It does so by embracing the principle of “Never forgetting” and then wrongly supposing that this is best accomplished by always blaming. 

Self-respect is about not tolerating wrongdoing rather than about incessantly blaming others for the wrong that they have done.  And, ironically, the best way not to tolerate the wrong that others have done is to put oneself in a position that makes it exceedingly difficult for them commit that wrong again.  This is one part of what it means to command the respect of another. There is absolutely nothing like success when it comes to tearing asunder the view that one is inadequate; and a pre-occupation with blaming others is unequivocally not a catalyst for success. 

 

Constantly blaming others, by contrast, is none other than a form of moral servitude masking as self-respect—a way of underwriting and continually reminding oneself of one’s inadequacy.  Constantly blaming others is not and cannot be a way of commanding the respect of others, though it might very well be a way of motivating others to appease one. 

 

Affirming self-respect is necessarily a form moral progress, whereas being obsessed with blaming others is necessarily an impediment to moral progress. 

We can call the obsession with blaming others anything we please.  But nothing is more telling in this regard than the fruits of our actions.  If over the years, we have nothing much to show for our actions others than a steadfast commitment to blaming others for having wronged us, then that is a good sign that we need to change course.  Prudence alone suggests that. 

 

What a marvelous confluence: self-respect and prudence.  Affirming our self-respect is a most prudent thing to do and if we are prudent that is what we will do.  An obsession with blaming others is not in keeping with either.  And this tells us something that is, at once, both profound and disturbing, namely that dysfunctionality has a most incredible grip upon the lives of so many in our society.  For only dysfunctionality could explain how so many could fail to do what is both prudent and affirming of their self-respect. 

View Article  Bankrupt Equality

E

quality is all the rage.  Yet, it is far from clear what we actually want.  This is because there is multitude of ways in which we can have equality.  At one extreme, we can have eviscerated equality: that is, equality shorn of any and all forms of excellence.  At the other extreme, we can have ennobling equality, namely equality that embraces moral and intellectual excellences.  Our naiveté consists in thinking that we have all that we need just so long as we have equality.  Surely not.   Equality in Dante’s inferno does not turn hell into paradise.

 

So it is not enough that we are all equal.  We must, of necessity, address the ways in which we all want to be equal.  In this regard, it would seem that modern democracies have not done a very good job; and for precisely this reason, they are losing their power to inspire 

 

Cesspool equality seems to be the order of the day in democracies across the world.  Stupidity, impoliteness, thoughtlessness, crass indifferences along with inexcusable and absolutely flagrant self-indulgence are all constitutive of what I call cesspool equality.  This horrendous collective precludes any semblance of either honesty or responsibility or integrity. 

 

Notice the wording here: “any semblance of either honesty or responsibility or integrity”.  By this wording, I am drawing attention to the fact that we are the point in society where we are no longer even concerned to appear to have these traits of character.  Indeed, they almost seem to be liabilities rather than assets.

Once upon a time, no one wanted even to give the impression of being someone lacking in integrity, honesty, and responsibility.  And so by the time people actually went through the motions in order to look the part in actuality, there was in fact something substantive on to which people could latch.   Not any more.

 

We can have a society most of whose citizens are morally bereft.  There will be no gainsaying the equality between us in that regard.  Yet, we will not have an equality that is worth fighting for, let alone worth dying for.  Indeed, we will barely have an equality that is worth living for.  For in a world, shorn of honesty, integrity, and a sense of responsibility, we will have a state of affairs in society that calls to mind Hobbes’s State of Nature.  There is nothing that would recommend being born in it. 

 

If I have got it right, a most dramatic feature about cesspool equality is that it flounders when it comes to underwriting a reason for living.  Indeed, cesspool equality eviscerates the distinction between human beings and (non-human) animals.  Thus, whereas the term “jungle” in reference to human beings was none other than a metaphor, there is increasingly an inescapable resonance of truth to it nowadays days.  But then what would one expect in societies that no longer embrace integrity, honesty, and responsibility.  Drive these out from the fabric of our humanity, and what really is left to distinguish us, in a profound way, from the animals of the jungle?  The answer can be given in two words: Not much. 

 

When, on the other hand, we look at the moral excellences of ennobling equality, we see that it is the gift that keeps on giving; and it is a most precious gift that human beings can give to themselves.  Ennobling equality animates a reason for living and underwrites the conviction that excellences are worth making sacrifices for.  That is why it gives rise to heroes and the virtue of courage.

 

Ennobling equality inspires without occasioning self-indulgence.  It provides tranquility without numbing our moral sensibilities.  It affirms without depleting our strength.  To the weary, ennobling equality brings peace and comfort.

 

Ennobling equality was the flame that occasioned the Civil Rights Movement, making it possible for blacks of yesteryear to do far more with far less than blacks today do with vastly more resources and far more equality.   There could not be a Civil Rights Movement today.  Who make the sacrifices?  Who would put their lives on the line?  Who would have the courage?  Thank God that movement came along when it did. 

 

I have discussed the moral realm.  But it is clear that we can make the same point regarding the differences between cesspool equality and ennobling equality in the intellectual realm.  With cesspool intellectual excellence, people barely know how to say what they mean, much less to say it well.  It most certainly is arguable that with cesspool intellectual excellence, self-knowledge takes a nosedive.  People barely know who they are because they lack the linguistic skills to express themselves with any precision.

 

With cesspool intellectual equality we are like the walking dead—zombies, if you will.  We know that we are somebody, but we cannot give articulation to our personhood. 

 

With ennobling intellectual excellence, on the other hand, the depth of our souls is adorned with felicitous expressions and turns of phrase.  The firmament of our thought and imagination is ablaze with the fiery creativity that is occasioned by souls seeking ever richer ways to give expression and articulation to the reality of the experiences. 

 

With ennobling intellectual equality, we can give articulation—nay, we can even give definition to—what constitutes our destiny. 

 

Modern democracies have a choice to make.  For there is still enough left of the equality that we now embrace that is wonderful and marvelous whereby we can choose well.  But this will not always be so—especially if, in the name, of equality we ignore the reality that not everything that rightly goes by the name of equality is choice worthy. 

 

Equality is a genre of which there can be many, many quite different and radically incompatible instantiations.  A society whose members lose sight of this truth is one that ensures a downward spiral of humanity. 

 

Set to post automatically at 00:00 European time, 24 February 2007

View Article  Unfaithfulness and Moral Re-Certification

W

hat reason would anyone have to date and marry someone who has a history of unfaithfulness?  One answer, of course, is that people change.  And that answer is, indeed, fair enough.  Alas, this truth does not settle very much.  For one can ask what evidence is there that a person has changed.  It is not enough that a person declares that she or he has changed and is no longer prone to unfaithful behavior.  Quite the contrary, I should think it absolutely imperative that the individual can provide evidence that this is the case.* 

 

Consider.  If Jones has had one car accident after another where he has been at fault, there is an ice cube’s chance in hell that I would get in a car with him driving until after he has a sustained, suitably long period, of driving without an accident.  Or if there were one it would have to be obvious from nearly every conceivable direction that he, Jones, was absolutely not at fault.  Again, if someone had a history of making lots of egregious mistake with the income preparations of her customers, you couldn’t even pay me to hire that person as my tax accountant until after there had been a very long period of her doing the taxes of others without there a being a single iota of a problem.  You get the point here.

So the question is this: Why is it that when it comes to romantic ties we are considerably less demanding of evidence that a person has changed?  The question is particularly important because in so many respects so very much more is at stake.  So there we are demanding less evidence of a person’s change for the better when considerably more is at stake.  That is exceedingly odd and cries out for an explanation.  I want to offer one.

 

My own view is that there is a profound moral confusion going on here.  Being kind and being forgiving are perceived as virtues.  Accordingly, a person who insists upon proof of a change of character comes across as being harsh and callous and insensitive.

 

Well, although there is no gainsaying the claim that kindness and forgiveness are virtues, what does not follow from this in the least is that persons are automatically worthy of kindness and forgiveness.  And it is a simple truth that a person can be unequivocally unworthy of either kindness or forgiveness.  If I systematically waste large sums of money on booze, then I am afraid that I am quite unworthy of your kindness when I am need of funds to replace the car that was stolen from me.  And, if time and time again, I have sold crack to the children on the streets in our neighborhood, you would be a fool to forgive me simply because with tears in my eyes I say “I am sorry; I won’t do it again”. 

 

It is a wonderful thing to be nice.  In lots and lots of cases we do not need to evidence that a person is meritorious of our nice behavior.  This is because the situation makes it plain that this is so or the situation makes evidence of this kind more or less irrelevant.  I mean if a person with several bags full of groceries slips and falls upon the ice it would be rather stunning if the individual’s history were relevant to whether or not I should give that person a helping hand.  Obviously, I should. 

 

Again, if a person’s burst into flames owing to the car accident that just happened and I have some expertise at extinguishing such flames, there can be no doubt that I should move to help that person. 

 

Just so I can think of lots and lots of cases where kind behavior constitutes none other than misplaced compassion; and there is nothing at all virtuous about that.  In many respects, forgiveness is even more demanding than kindness.  Or, so it is if we are talking about trusting the offender again.  And when it comes to infidelity trust at the very center of things.  I have never stolen anything from the homes of any of my beloved friends; nor, a fortiori, have I ever made a sexual advance towards the wife of one of my married male friends.  And it is my view that if I should ever do either one of these things the friends in question should not forgive me unless I have proven myself worthy of their forgiveness.  That would take time; and in the case of the sexual advance, it could very well be that there could never be enough time. 

 

Far from constituting harshness on this their part, this would constitute a demand of excellence on their part of me—a demand that is manifestly warranted under the circumstances.  

 

From the very outset, deep and abiding trust is a matter of being trustworthy.  It is about having the appropriate moral record that a person can refer to.  This is all done rather informally and intuitively, to be sure.  Just so, this assessment is no less real. 

 

When a person has violated that trust, it is he who has destroyed and sullied his own record.  And it is he who must repair that record.  Until that work is done, forgiveness (involving trust) is simply not appropriate.  There is no lack of kindness here.  This is because all that one is doing is insisting that the record of excellence that makes trust appropriate again be put back in place. 

 

The following strikes me as a very helpful analogy.  Suppose that a person works for you and the activity she performs requires a certification.  If she loses her certification for that activity, it is not at all cruel or unkind or inappropriate or out of line to ask that she becomes re-certified before she can resume working for you again performing the activity in question.  One understands that sympathy and strong feelings of affection for the person are all simply irrelevant.  One needs the re-certification. 

 

When it comes to a breach of trust, forgiveness is much more like re-certification than not.  Forgiveness in the face of a breach of trust requires a moral re-certification.  And a person who is not willing to earn that moral re-certification does not merit forgiveness where this is a matter of trusting the individual again. 

We live in a feel-good-society; and feelings are characteristically seen as being about the moment.  Alas, this way of putting things loses sight of a most poignant truth, namely that some moments are simply impossible in the absence of the right history.  And the right history brings to the social interaction between two people a host of moral certifications, if you will—without which the social interaction between them would not and could not be what it is. 

 

We are living at a time when increasingly people are told that, in the name of love and kindness and forgiveness, they should set aside the requirements of moral certification or moral re-certification.  This is tantamount to demanding that we settle for less moral excellence than we ought to from those whom we love.  And history shows that when we settle for less moral excellence than we ought to from those whom we love, the odds are that we will live to regret it.  For one, we will never have the tranquility that we so very much sought in our relationship with that individual.  For another, the breach of trust for which we did not demand a moral re-certification is very likely to make yet another appearance, tearing asunder our hopes.  Forgiveness and kindness are virtuesneither reasons nor excuses to be foolhardy.  Nor, a fortiori, are they reasons to turn our back on moral excellences itself.  Nothing has ever substituted for moral excellence; and modernity has no chance whatsoever ever of changing that reality.  

 

*This essay was inspired by The Dr. Laura Program, 19 February 2007.

 

View Article  The Struggles of Blacks and Gays: Tim Hardaway

O

ne does not have to be a strong supporter of gay rights in order to think that Tim Hardaway’s remarks were simply beyond the pale.  Whatever else is true, there can be no excuse for the hatred of any group of people.  Of course, the question that so many seem to ask is:  How can a black person, of all people, display such flagrant bias towards gays?  And implicit in this question is the assumption that, in the struggle for equality, the plights of blacks and gays in America are sufficiently parallel that blacks should be especially sensitive to the struggle of gays.  

 

Now, I am intrigued by the assumption that we have two parallel plights here.  I have heard many gays insinuate or assert this.  The “back of the bus” metaphor is commonly enough invoked nowadays by gays.  But I have never seen a good argument in support of this assumption.  And I have wondered two things: (1) Why blacks as opposed to women or Jews or Asians or Native Americans?  To my knowledge, a good answer has never been given to this question.  (2) Is it also supposed to be the case that gays, owing to their own struggles for equality, should be especially sensitive to the struggles of blacks?  Or to put the question another way: Should we be stunned to find racism in the gay community because after all there is no substantive difference between discrimination against gays and discrimination against blacks and if anyone knows what flagrant discrimination is about gays do?  Well, I have seen no evidence whatsoever that the gay community in America, which is largely animated by whites, is a haven for racial equality, exhibiting heightened sensibilities regarding the burden of race that one is not apt to find elsewhere. 

 

Now, I am not warming up to an argument that purports to excuse Hardaway, as I do not think that there is any acceptable excuse for the vituperative claims that he made regarding gays.  What concerns me, however, is the growing assumption that blacks are especially culpable for not understanding the plight of gays. 

It is assumed without argument that skin color and sexual preference are on the same ontological plane from the standpoint of social interaction.  And the idea that gayness is simply a matter of genetics is meant to strengthen the parallel: no can help being born black; no one can help being born gay.  But even if we concede this, what simply does not follow is that skin color and sexual preference are on the same ontological plane from the standpoint of social interaction.  This holds all the more in a world that is increasingly sexual at every turn. 

 

Surely we understand perfectly well why a female student might be uneasy if I, the male professor, should put my hand on her shoulder, though it is in the classroom in front of everyone that I do this.  No one argues that the very context of the classroom makes the issue of sexuality irrelevant.  This is because everyone knows that this seemingly innocuous instance of behavior can, in fact, be anything but that or that it may evolve into something that is no longer innocuous.  By contrast, if I put my hand on the shoulder of a male student, the assumption of heterosexuality does a lot of work in terms of precluding the idea that this might be an expression of sexual interest.

 

To the best of my knowledge, none of these sorts of legitimate concerns get off the ground owing to skin color alone.  I do not put my hand on the shoulder of a female student, regardless of her ethnicity; whereas I think nothing of putting my hand on the shoulder of a male student—and again: regardless of ethnicity. 

Given the assumption of heterosexuality, sexuality invariably adds a dimension to our social interactions that has no analogue at all with respect to color.  We negotiate that space; and there are things that we do not do (such as my putting my hand on a female student’s shoulder) precisely because we understand that doing so raises too many issues.  We negotiate this space whether it is between members with the same skin color or not.  No one in her or his right mind can deny this.

 

Quite simply, sexuality bespeaks a level of intimacy that has no equal in the realm of differences across skin color or ethnicity.  This is so whether we are talking about heterosexuality or homosexuality.  Take the very best of friends, whatever their color or ethnicity might be, and add sex to the friendship, and one gets a level of intimacy on an entirely different plane

 

These considerations suggest that racism and homophobia have two radically different trajectories.  The view on the of Xs that Ysare their intellectual equal is vastly different from the view that sexual desire is equally natural and appropriate whether the object of that desire is someone of the opposite sex or the same sex.  Both views may be correct but that are about quite different things.  This should not be a surprise, as the history of sexism itself shows.  The belief that someone is my intellectual equal hardly implies a sexual interest; likewise, the belief that someone is my intellectual inferior hardly implies the absence of a sexual interest. 

And here is the part that is perhaps controversial.  As we conceive of equality, there is nothing about the nature of equality across differences in color that give rise to complexity in social interaction; whereas the view that sexual desire is equally natural and appropriate regardless of the sex of the person adds considerable complexity to social interaction.  I know the sex and color of all my friends.  But I must confess that invariably their skin color is far less significant to me.  By contrast, their sex influences dramatically the way in which I interact with each of them.  I do not greet my female friends in the way that I greet my male friends; and my non-verbal behavior differs in important ways between my female friends and my male friends. 

 

Race and sexual orientation are two radically different forms of human ontology.  To experience one is not to have a window of insight into the character of the other.  If one is racist and thinks that John (of a different color) is one’s inferior owing to his race, one will have one kind of reaction if John presents himself as being one’s equal; whereas one will have an entirely different kind of reaction if John contends that one is the object of his sexual desire, though one is of the same sex as John.  Even if we have disgust in both cases, the grounds for that disgust will differ.  Lots of things disgust me (hypocrisy and slothfulness, for example) but they do so for quite different reasons. 

 

Speaking broadly, the victim of racism is hurt because the excellence that he has manager to exhibit with considerable mastery is dismissed out of hand.   The victim of homophobia is hurt because the configuration of sexual desire he takes to be natural and innocent is dismissed on both counts.  Indeed, the configuration overshadows all that he does.  And the claim is that if the configuration of sexual desire would change, then his excellences would then be taken seriously.  But notice that the configuration is not an excellence at all.  It is merely a biological given. 

 

Notice, too, the issue has never been about whether gays could exhibit excellence.  But the conditions under which the excellences exhibited would be acknowledged.  With blacks, on the other hand, the very claim was that blacks are the sort of creatures who are incapable of exhibiting excellence.  Needless to say, this is a fundamental difference between racism and homophobia.  

 

So we starkly put the difference as follows: For gays, it has been this: If you do X, then we will take seriously the excellences of which we know you are capable.  For blacks, it has you are creatures who are incapable of exhibiting moral and intellectual excellences.  

 

We have two fundamentally different social orbits here.  What Mr. Hardaway said about gays was utterly indefensible.  But this is not because the black experience is only a hair’s breadth away from the gay experience—and conversely.  They are quite different social orbits entirely.  Not a politically correct thing to say, but it is true nonetheless.  

View Article  In Praise of Femininity and Masculinity

I

like women who are feminine and men who are masculine.  Now, I understand that femininity and masculinity admits of degrees.  I understand also there is a kind of femininity and masculinity that is not about much more than sexuality.  I am not talking about that.  What is more, what I am talking about is hardly limiting; for countless are the ways in which a person can exhibit femininity and countless are the ways in which a person can exhibit masculinity.  I do not know any two women or any two men who, respectively, exhibit femininity and masculinity, in exactly the same way.

In the past, of course, femininity has been associated with weakness/submissiveness and masculinity with power/dominance.  When I think of femininity and masculinity, I do not think of any of these things. 

At the simplest level, the female body and the male body are two fundamentally different types of human bodies.  Most basically, then, femininity in a woman and masculinity in a man is simply a reflection of this reality—something that can be done with grace and aplomb in either case.  So, the appreciation of femininity, on the one hand, and masculinity, on the other, has about as much of a claim to being sexist as does the appreciation of the difference between infants and adults have a claim to exhibiting some form of bias. 

What does have a claim to being sexist is the view that women are intellectually inferior owing to just the fact that they are women and men are intellectually superior owing to the fact that they are men.  That is just so much nonsense.  And whatever else is true, technology has increasingly obliterated the relevance of physical strength in a variety of instances. 

There can be no denying the reality of sexism.  After all, it was not so long ago that women did not even have the right to vote in the United States.  This is really quite stunning when one thinks about it.  For even if one held that the smartest woman was never quite as smart as the smartest man, there has never been any doubt whatsoever that there have been lots and lots of men with less than stellar intellectual abilities; and if men with lack-luster intellectual abilities were entitled to vote surely women, who were certainly no worse-off in that regard, ought to have been allowed to vote.

Sexism has been and, in various ways no doubt, continues to be ever so real.  But what, alas, does the end of sexism portend?  And sometimes, it sounds as if ending sexism is about eradicating the very difference between women and men.  And that is what I am protesting. 

Indeed, it is very much a mystery to me that people who are so besotted with the idea of ethnic diversity often seem hell bent to denying the feminine-masculine divide. 

Equality at its very best is about synchronization of differences, which contribute in a variety of ways to the greater good, rather than the elimination of them.  Certainly, that is the idea across ethnic groups.  I cannot for the life of me see why this very same idea does not hold between women and men. 

Freud introduced the idea of penis envy; and every now and then it seems to me that feminists validate his point.  The idea that (1) women and men should be equal with respect to social, moral, and intellectual privileges is one thing; whereas the idea that (2) women should be more male-like or that men should be more female-like is another thing entirely.  Advocating for the first has nothing whatsoever to do with “penis envy” and everything to do with taking oneself seriously as a human being.  Advocating for the second, by contrast, strikes me as very much a form of what Freud called “penis envy”. 

It is typically claimed that femininity and masculinity are nothing more than social constructs.  But that cannot be quite right.  To be sure, the present representation of femininity and masculinity in contemporary society is undoubtedly a social constructive.  But from this truth what surely does not follow is that femininity and masculinity are nothing more than social constructs. 

Consider that we expect people with very long legs to take long strides.  It would be very odd indeed to see such a person taking little itty-bitty steps.  We get a difference in bodily movement simply in virtue of a difference in length of legs.  Why on earth would anyone would think that the we would not get a difference in bodily movements between, on the one hand, human beings with a vagina and breasts and, on the other, human beings without these but who possess a penis.  From a purely experiential point of view, we have a substantive difference here. 

Whatever else is true, a man of sound mind cannot think that he is walking about with a vagina and a pair of breasts.  Whatever else is true, a woman of sound mind cannot think that she is walking about with a penis.  We arrive at this truth about the difference between women and men in the matter of walking without an ounce of social construction.  By contrast, who should wear pants versus dresses, and the like, is very much a matter of social construction. 

Now, if one thinks that how one experiences one’s body has some bearing upon how one experiences the world, then the bodily differences between women and men can be carried even further.  From disease to physical harm, there are important differences between the bodies of women and men—differences that hardly make one body-type superior or inferior to the other.  And once more, this holds true without an ounce of social construction. 

Without a doubt society has embellished femininity and masculinity; and it has often focused more upon femininity more than masculinity, thus burdening women in a way that it has not burdened men.  But notice that as brute strength has become increasingly irrelevant in society, the idea of masculinity has also become more embellished.  Thus, the level of concern that men have regarding their appearances has shot up dramatically.  Brute strength is one thing; being sculptured is quite another. 

But what can I possibly say?  A man with pecks is one thing; a woman with breasts is quite another.  And ne’er a man wants his pecks to be mistaken for breasts; for pecks are meant to exude masculinity rather than femininity.   

Femininity speaks to what is constitutive of having a female body.  Masculinity speaks to what is constitutive of having a male body.  The difference, far from being a curse, gives rise to an endlessly resounding richness in human interaction.  We are all better off for appreciating the differences rather than destroying them by imposing, of all things, a vicious and unworkable social construction of the self. 

Androgyny, like some forms of medication, is tolerable in small doses.  Writ-large, it is surely a vice.