f there are any moral gifts that apply to everyday life, decency surely counts among them.  What we call the Golden Rule, “Do unto to others as you would have them do unto you,” is meant to capture the idea of decency.  It is a very simple fact that no one wants to be wrongly treated by another.  To be sure, we can be mistaken in either direction as whether or this has happened to us: we can think that we have been mistreated when we haven’t; and we think that we have not been mistreated when we have.  An instance of the latter would the thought that one is being made a very good and generous offer when in fact one is being cheated. 

But if the searching insight of the Golden Rule were none other than that no one wants to be wronged, hence no one should wrong others, then I am afraid that this rule would be considerably less interesting than it is.  What makes the Golden Rule profound are its implications for how a person who has in fact been wronged should behave. 

At its most searching level, the Golden Rule implies that having been victim of wrongdoing does not itself constitute an excuse to treat others wrongly.  Consider: Surely, no one thinks that Jones has an excuse, let a justification, to rob someone just because he was just robbed.  Again, if Smith has been falsely accused no one thinks for a moment that Smith thereby has an excuse, let alone a justification, to falsely accuse someone else. 

Moral pain, so the Golden Rule implies, does not render us morally blameless when it comes to inflicting a like pain upon another.  Thus understood, the Golden Rule turns out to be a rather demanding moral precept. 

We easily miss this because we focus upon the Golden Rule as a basis for exhibiting social warmth, such as be polite.  I think that people should be polite.  But strictly speaking, the absence of politeness qua social warmth is note impoliteness.  A person can do precisely what she is supposed to do in precisely the way that she is supposed to do it in a very official-like manner, exhibiting neither politeness qua social warmth nor impoliteness.  Indeed, if truth be told, it is sometimes the case precisely what we want is none other than an individual is very official-like. 

So, as I have said, interpreting the Golden Rule as applying only to politeness qua social warmth eviscerates the rule somewhat.  Social warmth is good, but exhibiting it as such is not at the heart of being a moral person.

Whilst I am not a Kantian, it seems to that he got it right when suggested that acting morally under adverse circumstances is the true test of our moral mettle.  The profundity of the Golden Rule can be seen as providing a commonsense reason why we should do what is morally right even in the face of great moral pain, especially the pain of having been wronged by another.  Morally right behavior in this context constitutes a level of moral majesty that can rarely be surpassed. 

Drawing upon Aristotle’s words, anybody can be angry when mistreated.  Anybody can be tempted to seek revenge or to lash out or to destroy when in the throes of moral pain.  However, it is the moral person who has the self-command to refrain from doing notwithstanding the temptations of the moment.  It is the moral person who possesses sufficient self-command that she or he never allows her or his pain to be an excuse to lose sight of the humanity of the other. 

Thus, the Golden Rule underscores the importance of self-command.  At the very minimum, self-command consists in the wherewithal to do what is right notwithstanding whatever desires we might have to act to the contrary.  And surely that is the hope of humanity.  If wrongdoing licenses wrongdoing, then we faced with a vicious cycle.

It goes without saying that no one thinks that it is all right to be wronged by another just because that other person had been wronged.  In reminding us of this truth, the Golden Rule gives us a reason to stay our own hand when we have been wronged.  Accordingly, if we could count on the members of society to provide by the Golden Rule, then we would have a basis for trust between fellow human beings that would have no equal except perhaps among saints. 

If these remarks have any semblance of plausibility to them, then the emphasis upon feelings and their satisfaction that has become commonplace is terribly misguided. 

There is, to be sure, a time and a place for feelings to have sway—but even then only some feelings.  But a society in which trust abounds is not one in which all that matters are feelings and their satisfaction.  Indeed, the two states of affairs are terribly at odds with one another.  Most poignantly, when feelings and their satisfaction are all that matter, then self-command is out of the question; and the Golden Rule simply cannot operate.

Trust is warranted only when we believe that others have the wherewithal to act as they should both in the present and in the future.  The Golden Rule asks each member of society, on behalf of each member of society, “Can you, oh citizen, be trusted to do what is right by others notwithstanding the moral pain that you have experienced?”  The survival of all societies is inextricably tied to how most members of society can answer that question. 

I conclude with a somewhat chilling observation.  Human beings, unlike other species, can deliberately choose to do things that undermine the extent to which the members of society are trustworthy.  We have become artful at discounting the Golden Rule and our pre-occupation with our own mistreatment and injustices has been the raison d’être for our so behavior.  We have told ourselves that so-behaving constitutes an undeniable sign that we have self-respect. 

Alas, there is a fundamental difference between learning and fully appreciation the ways in which we have been wronged and wallowing in the wrong that we have suffered.  The latter, but not the former, is an excuse for ignoring the self-respect of others and so for ignoring the Golden Rule.  In turn, the latter also undermines the basic trust of society.  Whatever this might be called, it cannot rightly be called moral progress.