ne of the most riveting lessons to be learnt from the fact that, in prison, many heterosexual men regularly seek to receive oral sex from men or to have the active role in anal sex with men is that most of us can become used to just about anything given that we find ourselves in circumstances favorable to the behavior in question.  Indeed, inmates who regularly penetrates other men for sexual relief is apt to think it obvious that any man who does not fight not to the death to avoid anal penetration is a faggot.  As to what on earth this observation has to do with hatred and the internet, I shall explain in what follows. 

For what it is worth, I believe that democracy can survive only insofar as it veers towards the truth.  And while the American democracy once did that with great majesty, I no longer think this is the case.

It is I believe a striking feature of politics in America that politics have become increasingly about cultivating an attitude of hatred towards those with whom we disagree.  We as a nation have increasingly become accustomed to invoking and hearing the language of hatred in reference to others.  This, I maintain, is bringing about a shift in our moral sensibilities.  And therein lies the relevance to the initial remarks about straight men having gay sex in prison.  I gather that the average heterosexual who ends up prison does not suddenly think that gay sex is a good thing.  Rather, as Thomas Nagel observed in his essay “Sexual Perversion,” things have to get pretty bad before we opt for no sex at all.  Prisoners negotiate with that reality. 

Every time I recall that Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee both admired one another although they fought on opposing sides of the Civil War, I am pained about how numb our moral sensibilities have become when I consider the rhetoric of today’s political differences.  Both Liberals and Conservatives are at fault here.

A Liberal might refer to someone as a “moral callous bastard who would sell his own mother for profit”.  Conservatives have referred to abortion as America’s holocaust.  In either case, there is very little room to think well of the person so characterized.  Perhaps no one believes this sort of thing at heart.  That, however, does not change the fact that we have become used to employing that sort of language in the way we characterize those with whom we disagree.  And if we have become used to it, then it follows that we have become numb to just how inappropriate such characterizations are.

But how does the technology come into play in all of this?  The answer, quite simply, is that technology has made it possible for human beings to be extremely manipulative in their presentation of things.  In particular, technology has made it possible to invoke rather visceral emotions with all sorts of images.  It almost does not matter what the context might be.  An example of this is seeing images of Muslim women being fired upon.  It almost becomes irrelevant that the women are protecting Muslim men who are prepared to commit quite atrocious acts.  Indeed, it becomes irrelevant that the very scene of the Muslim women surrounding the mosque is staged in order to shock the sensibilities of the Western viewer. 

So, while it may be true that technology has made more information available than ever before, it is also case that now, more than ever before, our assessments are increasingly based upon mere feelings rather than reasoned reflections.  Indeed, where we ought to be angry for being misled by images, it seems to me that we are increasingly unable to see that we are being misled by the images. 

Increasingly, then, our assessments of events are more consistent with the images that we behold or the sound-bites that we hear (even when those images and sound-bites are misleading) than with the facts that actually pertain to the matter.  This truth gives political opponents a reason to be more concerned with images and sound-bites than truth.  This truth makes it the case that invoking feelings of hatred towards one’s opponent is increasingly a rational strategy to employ even when the facts do not in any way warrant that assessment.

Kant rightly observed that the capacity for rational reflection marks the difference between human beings and other species.  But what is manifestly false is that most human beings can fully realize that capacity in the absence of a social environment that is conducive to rational reflection.  We are quintessential social creatures; and what that means is that most of us are profoundly influenced by the character of our social environment.  That is what the case of prison gays sex shows ever so profoundly.  The example is telling precisely because sexual preference seems so very inexorable.  In prison, the active/passive distinction does work in terms of whether one is gay or straight; yet, on the outside the active/passive distinction seems to have no relevance whatsoever. 

Lies repeated in the “right way” and at the “right time” can in fact become accepted as truths.  And nothing has facilitated repeating lies in the “right way” and at the “right time” like technology. 

The issue, of course, is not whether there have always been evil people around, prepared to do whatever it takes in order to have power.  We know that this is true.  Rather, the issue is whether technology has facilitated being evil in ways that have, as it were, outpaced our humanity.  I believe that it has. 

One the one hand, technology has escalated the language of hatred by making the manipulation of images and sound-bites very easy to do.  On the other, people have become numb to the language of hatred as a result of being constantly exposed to these forms of manipulation.  In particular, it is increasingly the case that, notwithstanding the wealth of information now available, people think more with their feelings than ever. 

This brings me back to the point of veering towards the truth.  There is not now, nor has there ever been, a formal correlation between feelings and truth.  And Americans have become a nation of people that privileges feelings over truth.  So in the oddest of ways, we now legitimate hatred.  Indeed, we are no longer united by the truths that we hold to be unshakable but simply by the feelings that we share.  Accordingly, it is not what another says, but how we feel towards that individual.

If this is right, then a most surprising conclusion is that at this point in time a person of Adolph Hitler’s ilk would more likely experience greater success in America than an individual of Winston Churchill’s personage.  Hitler preyed upon the weaknesses of a nation; Churchill called a nation to greatness.  Hitler played upon the feelings of the average citizen of Nazi Germany.  Churchill asked a nation to rise above its feelings. 

Are we better off?  You tell me.  A nation whose citizens have become so numb that the language of hatred is an on-going part of the daily experience of their lives is, no matter who is hating whom, a nation that will surely perish in the fulness of time.   

ost significantly, there is nothing resembling a right to be heard.  The First Amendment reads thus: “Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech . . .”.  It never ever says that anyone has a right to an audience.  That is, the right to an audience does not follow in the wake of the right to free speech.  Accordingly, the failure to invite someone to speak to an audience is not thereby a violation of that person’s right to express her or his views. 

If this is right, then we can ask about any individual the following question: Would it be a good thing to provide that individual with an audience.  This question does not get either an affirmative or a negative answer simply because it is true that the individual in question has a right to speak. 

Suppose a woman’s rape crisis group of 30 members meets regularly.  Would it be a good thing for them to invite to one of their meetings a man—call him Opidopo—who thinks that women prefer to be raped but are unwilling to admit it?  Obviously not.  We may correctly hold that Opidopo is entitled to his opinion and that he is entitled to express it publicly on a street corner, for example.  But from neither of these two truths does it all follow that it would be a good thing for the rape crisis group to invite Opidopo to one of their meetings. 

It would be a good thing to invite him, I suppose, if the women gained some knowledge about why there are men like this Opidopo or if there was reason for the women to believe that they could disabuse Opidopo of his horrendous views.  Listening even to one’s enemy can be an extremely learning experience.  But it need not; and people can have very good reason to believe that doing so would not be. 

This brings me to Iran’s president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejadand his invitation to speak at Columbia University.  Needless to say, President Ahmadinejad had no entitlement to speak at Columbia University.  Had the University not invited him to speak, he would not in any way have been wronged.  Had no university in New York or, for that matter, the entire United States invited President Ahmadinejad to speak, he would not in way have been wronged.  In particular, his right to free speech would not have been violated. 

So the real question, then, has to be was it a good thing to invite him to Ahmadinejad to speak at Columbia University?  It will be remembered that the right to speak does not entail that one is entitled to be given an audience.  So the question, then, is: Was it a good thing to give Ahmadinejad an audience at Columbia University?

That free speech is a good thing does not, in and of itself, make it a good thing that Columbia University extended an invitation to him.  The example above regarding a woman’s rape crisis group underscores this point.  As I noted, we can imagine a scenario where inviting someone like Opidopo (who believes that woman like being raped) to a woman’s rape crisis meeting woman would be a good thing.  As I noted, one aim could be to understand men like Opidopo.  Another could be to disabuse him of his views.  In either case, the good would be for reasons that are quite independent of the truth that free speech is a good thing.

The second consideration shows that the fact that someone is morally bankrupt is compatible with there being good reasons to invite the person to speak to an audience.  Notice, though, that in the second example that Opidiopo is invited for just the wicked person that he is, because it is supposed that the women will be able to change him from his wicked ways.  There is no pretense that he is an upright man or that listening to him is a good thing in and of itself.  Even in the first case, where the women listen to Opidopo in order to learn about men like him, Opidopo is there to serve the noble aims of the women.  In either case, Opidopo’s right to free speech is not what entitles him to be at the woman’s rape crisis meeting.

Was inviting President Ahmadinejad to speak at Columbia University a good thing?  This is not obvious to me.  For one thing, I worry about empowering evil, even symbolically.  The man has an absolutely horrible track-record of deep, deep hostile and oppression attitude towards gays; and the women in his society are effectively second class citizens.  Many on the left should be troubled mightily by this.  Then there is his utterly hostile attitude towards Israel—the country which he thinks should be wiped off the map.  Yet, this man can now say that he spoke at Columbia University with all that this implies in terms of prestige.  And that is a form of empowerment. 

Now, I would have been prepared to set aside this empowerment consideration had there been any good reason to believe that Ahmadinejad would have exhibited even a modicum of integrity—had he taken seriously the questions put to him regarding women and gays and Israel.  Ahmadinejad did not; and there was never any reason to believe that he would have done so.  The searching introduction of President Ahmadinejad, by Columbia University's president Lee Bollinger, is about as close as we get to an honest exchange with Ahmadinejad. 

Nor, finally, is there any reason to believe that the richness or the power of the principle of free speech which we rightly hold so dear was in any way whatsoever underwritten or made more secure or more perfect by Columbia University’s speaking invitation to President Ahmadinejad. 

Was inviting President Ahmadinejad to speak at Columbia University a good thing?  I have indicated that I do not see that this question plausibly admits of an affirmative answer. 

In so many ways, though, the more important point is not whether the question, “Was inviting President Ahmadinejad to speak at Columbia University a good thing?” admits of an affirmative answer or a negative one, but that in either the correct answer, whatever that might be, does not flow from the truth that he has a right to free speech.  This is because that right has never ever constituted an entitlement to an audience.  The right to speak does not entail the right to be heard by others.  If it did, then the right to free speech, far from being a most majestic and ennobling liberty, would constitute a horrendous form of oppression.

rofessor Randy Pausch of Carnegie Mellon-University gives new meaning to the expression “Take the bull by the horns”.  If I were looking for a hero in life—sometime to represent the will to live in spite of it all—he would no doubt be that person.  One of his memorable sayings is that while we have no control over the hand of cards that we are dealt, how we play that hand is up to us.  I encourage everyone to listen to his lectures which have been posted on YouTube.

In 2006, he learnt that he has a most deadly illness, namely pancreatic cancer.  A year later, 18 September 2007, he gave his final lecture at Carnegie-Mellon University to a packed audience.  Breathtaking courage, grace, and majesty characterized the lecture—to say nothing of a dignity that testified to the greatness of the human will.  Insofar as it is possible for a human being to stare death in the face and say “While you may destroy my body, you may not touch soul,” Professor Pausch did exactly that.  He would seem to have no fear of dying; and I shall conclude this essay by proffering an explanation for why that might be so. 

For those who came to cry and to show their pity for him, no doubt they were sorely disappointed.  For Professor Pausch’s final lecture had nothing to do with garnering pity and sympathy from those in the audience.  Rather, the lecture had everything to do with how to live well.  Far from being in denial, as some might suppose, Pausch is profoundly and poignantly aware of the reality of illness.

Ostensibly, Randy Pausch’s lecture was about his childhood dreams.  And this already tells us something exceedingly profound about the man, to with the following: He had lived well and he knew it.  This was not so much a boast on his part.  Not at all.  Rather, it was an expression of a very deep and abiding form of self-knowledge on his part—the sort of self-knowledge that can perhaps prevail even against the gates of hell. 

So while the lecture was incredibly amusing, the real meaning of the lecture was absolutely riveting.  What he said might seem to be just so much commonsense.  But in a world in which people think that they have a right to succeed his message warrants repeating. 

Professor Pausch made it unequivocally clear that anyone who wants to succeed at a goal must be prepared to pursue that goal even when the going gets rough and so many barriers stand in the way.  Indeed, he puts the point this way: the barriers serve to indicate just how important achieving the goal really is to us.  If all it takes to dissuade us is a single obstacle—be it an inconvenience or a less than enthusiastic welcome, then it is doubtful that we really wanted to achieve that goal in the first place. 

In fact, it can be plausibly argued that the knowledge that we have actually achieved precisely the goal that we wanted to achieve comes in part from the reality that we pursued that goal even when we were faced with obstacles.  After all, I might accept any number of things that are simply handed to me.  Accordingly, my having them is not thereby a sign of my truly wanting them.  But what I freely pursue with all my heart are surely those things that I really want. 

Death is a great equalizer.  When given the time, such as a few months, to see that death is irrevocably on its way, all individuals are forced to ask whether they did their best in life.  For the future has been foreclosed; and all that remains is that of reviewing the past. 

From the very outset, Randy Pausch makes it very clear that he had a marvelous upbringing and a most wonderful childhood.  And it is obvious that he is a very smart fellow.  But as I listened to various aspects of his lecture, there are two messages that come through loudly and clearly.  I have already indicated one of them: Anyone who wants something has got to be phenomenally creative at getting it. 

The other message is that nothing underwrites one’s sense of self-esteem like having a history of being creative in successfully pursuing one’s goals.  To be sure, praise is wonderful.  It is even necessary.  However, praise unaccompanied by the relevant experiences leaves one more empty-handed than not. 

Now, here is the final and most seminal lesson that I took from Professor Randy Pausch’s lecture and the manner in which he presented it.  I should preface my remarks by saying that I do not know him at all.  The only thing that I have to go on is what I have seen on YouTube and various reports on the news. 

It is striking in every conceivable way that Randy Pausch shows no fear at all of dying.  This claim is not to be confused with the quite different claim that he is indifferent to dying.  There is no evidence of that at all.  I should think it obvious to anyone that the man wants to live. 

My explanation for why Randy Pausch has no fear of dying is simply that for the most part he has no significant regrets or exceedingly few of them.  That is, he has for the most part courageously pursued his calling in a morally noble way.  This is all that anyone, including God, could ask of anyone. 

To be sure, Pausch wants to live a long life; and it undoubtedly pains him that this will not be so, especially since he will leave behind a wife and three children.  This pain, though, is not the pain that comes from having played poorly the hand that one had been dealt.  It is not the pain of regret that is tied to having used poorly the talents that God has given one.  It is not the pain that comes from having wronged another.  Nor, in particular, is it the pain that comes from not having found enormous meaning in life.  It is, instead, the very deep pain of knowing that one will not be there for one’s loved ones.  Unless one’s premature death is tied to wrongful behavior on one’s part, such a death cannot be a source of genuine regret. 

With a premature death, there is always the issue of having been shortchanged.  Those who have lived very meaningful lives, though, rarely look at it that way.  This is because the extraordinary contentment that one has with what one has done thus far is a marvelous buffer against the feeling of having been shortchanged.  After all, no one gets to do everything. 

The heroes of life are not those who have surmounted no obstacles at all and lived to tell us about it.  Rather, they are those whose life casts a very long shadow because they majestically beat the odds in overcoming the obstacles that were in their way.  Far too many suppose that equality is tantamount to a guarantee of success.  Randy Pausch’s life bears witness to the truth that equality at its best is about both freedom and what each individual does with that freedom. 

Randy Pausch is not going to live as long as he would like to live.  What is beyond question, though, is that he lived long enough to make it unequivocally clear to all, including himself, that his life was a meaningful one.  And that, alas, is a victory of which not even death can ever deprive him.  That, most assuredly, is self-knowledge at its best.  That was the real lesson of Randy Pausch's lecture. 

Insofar as the saying “Rest in peace” is a meaningful one, it must certainly turn upon the truth that one’s life was unequivocally a meaningful one.  Randy Pausch faces death with one of the greatest gifts that a person can give to herself or himself, namely that the unshakable knowledge that his life was a meaningful.  And it is that very gift that he gives to his family and friends—nay, even to a stranger like me.  Amen.

here are very few children who do not to speak.  Even mentally challenged children typically acquire a considerable measure of fluency in a language.  There is no language so complicated that a child does not come to master that language if she or he is regularly exposed to it, day in and day out, from infancy onward.  And that is the point.  The child has to be regularly exposed to the language day in and day out from infancy onward.  Whatever else is true, it would seem to me that acquiring moral excellence is more like that than not.  And if this right, then there is a way of thinking about the acquisition of moral character that is dead wrong.  As I shall argue, a profound mistake that we make in parenting is to think that issuing directives counts as modeling moral excellence or, in any case, that issuing directives suffices. 

Consider the language model once again.  No child chooses the maternal language that she or he masters.  Indeed, it is not even clear that a child could make that choice.  Rather, the competency that is characteristic of every native speaker is owing to the fact that the child is exposed to the language well-before she or he can speak it.  To be fluent in a language is essentially to know what to say and how to say it correctly without even having to think about it.  To be sure, one may know rules that are applicable.  Being fluent in a language, however, is not a matter of applying the rules very quickly when speaking.  Instead, it is to be able to speak in accordance with the rules without even having to think about the rules at all.

Moral fluency is like that.  But is that even possible even if we hold that moral character at its best is inextricably tied to choice of values?  What seems to me manifestly clear is that by the time most of us are capable of seriously reflecting upon principles and choosing them, it may very well be too late for those principles to become a part of our character in the way that language is a part of our thought.  

And this brings me to parental upbringing in a rather dramatic way.  Parenting at its best has to be about modeling moral excellence.  And a society at its best has to be one whose citizens for the most part model moral excellence.  A child learns a language in what is roughly a two-step manner: parents speak the language; others to whom the child is exposed speak the language.  The acquisition of a morally excellent character surely requires the same two-step process: parents model moral excellence and others to whom the child is exposed model moral excellence.  

Now, what is quite intriguing in all of this is that there are simply no shortcuts that one can take in all of this.  There is no way to make up for children not being exposed to a language on a regular basis, day in and day out.  There are no pills to prescribe or hypnosis to impose.  Nor, in particular, are there any “crash-courses” that we could put a child through that would enable her or him to make up for lost time. 

This seems so obvious when it comes to language that the point has an air of utter boredom and tedium to it.  Only a fool would think otherwise. 

But does not the same point apply to having a morally excellent character?  If it does, then we have something of an explanation for why modern societies are in a crisis.  There is a very profound sense in which acquiring a language is an exceedingly mundane process, as it is simply a matter of day-after-day exposure.  The same, alas, applies to acquiring a morally excellent character.

The difference, of course, is that there is very little human interaction that does involve speaking.  So there is almost no chance of a child not being exposed to the language of her or his community and country. 

But there can be lots of human interaction that manifestly misses the mark when it comes to moral excellence.  And therein lies the problem.  Let me explain.

Animals cannot speak.  Accordingly, the only thing that that adult animals can do is model behavior for their infants.  Much of animal behavior is driven by instinct.  Yet, just how to proceed, as with hunting, often requires some modeling.

Human beings are the only creatures on the face of the earth who can issue directives.  We are also the only creatures on the face of the earth who are capable massive self-deception.  The very thought that issuing directives to our children is good enough is an instance of enormous self-deception on our part.  No directive, however eloquently articulated, can replace parents modeling moral excellence before children. 

The Kantian influence in modern thought gives pride of place to directives given to us by the moral law which we then will ourselves to follow.  This insight, though extraordinarily powerful, misses the reality that nothing on the face of this earth can replace the experiencing of moral excellence on the part of one’s parts.  In particular, nothing whatsoever can replace being the direct beneficiary of experiencing moral excellence on their part.  This means that an at-home-parent has a considerable moral advantage in terms of inculcating moral excellence on the child’s part that no directive can match, no matter how much money is attached to that directive.

Many parents think that when monetary rewards are attached to a directive, this gives the directive an efficacy that it would not otherwise have.  Nonsense.  A directive thus constructed simply gives the child a reason to exhibit the relevant compliance behavior until the monetary reward is secure.  The directive does not in way whatsoever constitute modeling moral excellence on behalf of the child.  It is self-deception that allows us to think that it does.

With an at-home-parent, the child directly witnesses and experiences the way in which the parent exhibits moral excellence.  The child beholds her or his parent choosing in one way rather than another, attaching more importance to one thing rather than another, taking delight in one thing rather than another.  What better way could there be for a child to have what constitutes the Good affirmed in her or his life than to witness her or his loving parent choose what is Good—nay, indeed to participate in that choosing from to time.  This is to give the Good an imprimatur in a child’s life that no mere directive could possibly accomplish.  And it is that imprimatur configured in a child’s life that makes for excellence in moral character: a very intuitive and immediate grasp of what is right, along with a steadfast commitment to doing what is right. 

Thus, acquiring excellence in moral character is much more like acquiring a language than many would suppose.  For much of modernity, parenting is primarily about meeting a child’s basic material needs and then preparing the child to choose her or his own values. 

This sounds wonderful in theory, but it is utterly disastrous in practice.  This is tantamount to rendering a child like a ship without a sale.  Though often gesturing mightily towards the goods, the child frequently misses the mark.  For when it comes to morality, excellence requires not only that we can see the Good but that we are steadfast in realizing it.  And that steadfastness, like fluency in a language, is acquired by being around those who roundly exhibit it.  The arguments are nice, but they do not replace the experience of excellence exhibited by others. 

So it is with fluency in a language; so it is with excellence in moral character.  We are so constituted, biologically, that the first fluency in a language cannot be achieved otherwise.  Alas, it is also the case that we are so constituted, biologically, that with regard to excellence in moral character we are capable of masterfully deceiving ourselves as to what it takes to secure this end. 

Moral directives, like seeds, need fertile soil in which to take root.  To believe otherwise is deceive ourselves and to cheat posterity out of the moral anchor that it needs to flourish.

erhaps there is a God after all; for I find that I am in substantial agreement with Al Sharpton regarding the following point.  He thinks that a man does what is offensive in calling a woman a bitch, no matter what the race of the man might be and no matter what the race of the woman might be.  In particular, then, he thinks that Isaiah Thomas is wrong in holding that it is less offensive if a black man calls a black woman bitch than it is if a white man calls a black woman bitch. 

While I shall go on about this for a bit, I shall turn to offer what strikes me as quite interesting explanation for the disparity that many see in terms of what blacks say about the wrongs of other blacks, including the no snitch rule.  The explanation shall be quite fascinating; and I encourage readers to attend to it.  I shall then conclude on a surprisingly personal note.

Now, Al Sharpton’s condemnation of Isaiah Thomas is an extraordinary breath of commonsense on Sharpton's part.  The point, of course, should be one of those obvious truths that requires next to no reflection to grasp.  But that fact Mr. Sharpton should actually hold that a black person is just as wrong as a white person, given that both the black and white person has committed the exact same act is rather like a new-found refreshing spring of water coursing down a mountain side. 

For the pattern has been that high profile blacks who can see just about any wrong that a white commits somehow manage to see less of a wrong done when a black commits that very same act in circumstances that are exactly analogous. 

Isaiah Thomas, of course, should be ashamed of himself and black women everywhere should be outraged.  It would not surprise me, though, if Whoopi Goldberg, for instance, were come to Isaiah Thomas’s defense invoking the “Southern tradition”. 

As it turns out, I have, finally, an insight as to some of this behavior; and that fact that I should just now be arriving at this insight no doubt says something about me, though I am not clear just what.

It seem obvious to me that during American Slavery and the Jim Crow era blacks rightly chose not to acknowledge in front of whites the wrongs that blacks committed, since that would have been tantamount to subjecting the black to a kind of double jeopardy—indeed, subjecting the black to horrendous injustice on the part of whites.  The defensibility of this practice presupposes that blacks took matters into their own hands in terms of meting out some form of punishment of the offending member of the black community; otherwise, blacks would simply be tolerating wrongdoing on the part of one another; and that would make no sense at all.  In the context just described even no snitching makes perfectly good sense. 

Looking at the present, it would seem that many high profile blacks act as if it is true nowadays that whites would inflict considerable injustice among blacks for the wrongs committed by blacks or, in any case, whites would judge blacks far more harshly than they (whites) would judge whites for the exact same wrongdoing.  Let us refer to the italicized remarks as the residue of racism. 

The residue of racism idea need not entail any intentions on the part of whites to judge blacks more harshly.  The idea need only hold that generally speaking whites have been socially configured in this way.  Indeed, the thesis can even allow that many well-meaning whites have been configured this way.  It is an undeniable truth that social configurations can exert an inexorable influence upon us. 

One of my favorite examples in this regard is traffic.  In most countries, people drive on the right.  The United Kingdom and South Africa, for example, are among the exceptions.  There is nothing innate about driving on one side or the other.  Just so, to be raised in a country where driving is on the right is to have a very power tendency to do all sorts of things rather instinctively.  One can counter-command this tendency but it requires considerable will-power.

The residue of racism thesis simply entails that the nature of the legacy of racism is that many whites—their good intentions to the contrary notwithstanding—instinctively (owing to cultural upbringing) have the tendency to judge blacks more harshly than whites, where both the black and the white have committed the exact same wrong. 

Two questions arise: (1) Is the residue of racism thesis true?  (2) How should blacks behave if it is true?

Now, for those readers who know me, you may at this point have some insight into why I accord so much significance to Frederic Douglass’s remarks about gratitude.  For he claimed, almost counter-intuitively that it was ingratitude more than anything else that reminded him of the evil of slavery.  Not whips and chains, but ingratitude for the extraordinary service that, notwithstanding their enslavement, many black slaves rendered to whites.

I hold that wherever people of kind L naturally and instinctively show genuine gratitude for the good done on their behalf by members of this or that group, then that is an exceedingly good sign that the people of kind L are free of any biases towards that group.  That is, the racial residue thesis does notapply to those individuals who are naturally and instinctively disposed to show gratitude towards those who are kind to them, regardless of the ethnicity of those showing the kindness.

I shall conclude then on a frighteningly informative and personal note.  Over the years at Syracuse University, I have in a very direct and personal way nurtured a number of undergraduate students here: some white, some black, some Latino, some Asian, and so on.  I have received some extraordinary expressions of gratitude from the parents of white and Asian Syracuse University undergraduates.  To this date in my life, I have never received a single note of gratitude from a black parent or a Latino parent of a Syracuse University undergraduate whom I have nurtured. 

Finally in this vein there is this: I have for more than a decade taught one of the most successful philosophy courses that Syracuse University has ever known.  From so many (but by no means all) of my white colleagues, I have experienced next to no gratitude.  Or things have felt as if I were but a dog being given a pat upon the head.  A shining example to contrary, and so of genuine gratitude from a colleague, has been Dean Cathryn Newton, the out-going Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences.  I do not know what we have agreed upon.  I do know that she has always respected me as a person.  Under her leaderhip, I have not in anyway whatsoever been a minority to be showcased as a sign that she is not racist.  Not at all.  The same holds for Deborah Freund, former Vice-Chancellor and Provost here.  Professor called me in Paris and asked me to serve on the search comittee that chose Dean Newton; and Professor Freund's first remarks were: "I understand that you are a trouble-maker".  I knew immediately that she understood importance of affirming my independence as a thinking person. I often wonder if they both understand just how much this has meant to me. 

Now, from my students, the vast majority of whom are white: Their genuine gratitude has been one of the greatest sources of nurturance that I have known in life.  I am forever grateful for the role that they contually play in affirming my personhood.

ive me options or give me death!  Monsieur Patrick Henry did not make that claim.  He said “Give me liberty or give me death”.  He was claiming an entitlement that people should be free to choose to live their lives as they please, with the usual proviso that they do not wrong others.  Implicit in his majestic rhetorical claim is the premise that people are best suited to judge for themselves what is good for them; and behind that premise was a very rich view about objective right and wrong. 

Here is my view in a nutshell: If we define human progress in terms of creating new choices, then human progress is proceeding exponentially.  If, on the other hand, we define human progress in terms of exercising wisdom, it is arguable that human progress is regressing, in that with more knowledge than ever before our behavior is increasingly indefensible. 

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Needless to say, modernity differs sharply from the Mr. Henry’s era.  For one the thing, the very idea of right and wrong has fallen upon hard times.  Indeed, notwithstanding all the talk about equality regarding matters of sex and race and sexual orientation and whatever, people still seem to think that right and wrong does not amount to much more than mere opinion.  So while a great many of us like the idea of equality between the sex and the races, many of these very same people are loathed to say that requiring women to wear a burka is really wrong or that we can really say Nazi ideology is wrong.  For it is all about feelings; and the unvarnished truth is that those folks feel differently about such matters than we do.  And of course: Who is to say that their feelings are any less legitimate than ours? 

And if the above difference were not enough, there is the insight advanced by Ray Kurzweil, in his extraordinary book The Singularity is Near, in which he puts forth the thesis that technology will soon afford us options that have the effect of redefining humanity. 

I think that Kurzweil is absolutely right.  And that for me is the problem. 

It is absolutely wonderful to have choices.  But there is a proviso that lurks in the background to which no one is paying sufficient attention, namely that more often than not most of choose wisely.  Over time, a vast plethora of choices in the absence of wisdom on the part of most people making those choices will result in something akin to Armageddon on earth.

Now, when one extracts from recent human behavior over the last 20 years, there is a very frightening assessment that suggests itself, which is that in general human beings are not prone to making wise choices. 

If we were prone to making wise choices, then the possibilities of which Kurzweil speaks would truly be a blessing, precisely because we would have good reason to believe, given our past performance in making choices, that with the options envisioned by Kurzweil we would at least veer towards choosing wisely.

But human beings have shown themselves to be susceptible to the most ridiculous fads and to a lack self-control even in the face of obvious harm to their very physical well-being.  Massive credit card debt shows a lack of wisdom.  The stampedes and fights over toys during the Christmas season reveal an immaturity on the part of adults that is utterly painful.  The silliness of camping out for days in order to be one of the first to own a new gadget is quite mind-boggling.  Calling something an addiction has almost become a fad.  And I shall say nothing at all about that over which we have the most control, namely that which we put into our bodies.  Then there is the fact that ethnic identity has been pushed so far that in some case it has become an impediment to justice itself. 

Does anyone think for a moment that the black Whoopi Goldberg would have defended a white Michael Vick engaged in dog fighting?  Does anyone think for a moment that the blacks of Raleigh would have been so venemous towards a black Duke University lacrosse player accused of rape by a black woman of obviously questionable character?  And imagine whites calling for the swift conviction of a black lacrosse player in college accused of rape by a white woman with a quite tarnished reputation. 

As I said at the outset: If we define human progress in terms of creating new choices, then human progress is proceeding exponentially.  If, on the other hand, we define human progress in terms of exercising wisdom, it is arguable that human progress is regressing, in that with more knowledge than ever before our behavior is increasingly indefensible. 

The problem, obviously, is that an exponential increase in choices coupled with an increasing lack of wisdom is an absolute disaster. 

Interestingly, what I am referring to as wisdom is what my parents would have referred as none other than commonsense.  An abundance of choices on the part of those who fail to exercise commonsense even when it comes to the most to most basic choices is a recipe for an enormous crisis in the human condition. 

I have drawn attention to two very distinct vectors: options, on the one hand; wisdom, on the other.  It is typically supposed, and rightly so, that options in the hands of those who are evil will result in a catastrophy.  And I will concede for the sake of argument that in some sense there is less evil in the world. 

The problem, alas, is that options in the hands of those rather lacking in wisdom will also result in a catastrophy.  And the very considerations that allow me to entertain the hypothesis that there is less evil in the world also force me to say that wisdom, even on the part of the well-meaning, is very much in short supply. 

Humans can, of course, change the options that humanity might encounter.  The issue, though, is whether they have the will to do so.  And the evidence thus far is woefully discouraging.  There are, to be sure, beacons of wisdom here and there.  Unfortunately, that is not enough to sustain the light of wisdom that humanity needs.

I very much hope that I am wrong.  For if, in the end, all that we are doing is choosing between which catastrophy will engulf humanity, then we are, in effect, left with no real choice at all.