hen the framers of the U. S. Constitution exclaimed that “All men are created equal,” there is a manifestly straightforward sense in which what they said is unequivocally false.  If anything is obvious it is obvious that human beings differ widely from one another in just about every conceivable way—not least among these ways is in terms of abilities.  Once we move beyond very rudimentary activities, it becomes apparent ever so quickly that human differ widely in their abilities. 

The framers, of course, were talking about moral equality.  And it would never have occurred to them to associate moral equality with equality in terms of natural talent.  Whatever else is true, it is true that Thomas Jefferson did not think for a moment that the average American, of whatever color, was his equal in natural abilities.  Yet, Jefferson could have thought that in terms of moral standing the lowliest of individuals was his equal.

What is most fascinating is that the decline in moral objectivity is giving rise to the view that the abilities which people have is the ultimate measure of moral equality between individuals.  And that is a fundamental mistake. 

Morality gives people a platform upon which they can stand regardless of their differences.  And by taking morality seriously, we have thereby given people a conduit to seeing their lives as having meaning; for a person could take pride in the fact she or he is as upright being even if the person did not excel in other ways. 

Notice that the precipitous decline of objective morality has undermined—or better: destroyed—a moral platform that in times past given meaning to many lives.  It is thus no accident that people do not take pride in being decent in the way that they once did.  There is a very straightforward sense in which culture is denying people that possibility. 

But it gets worse, because people are trying to fill the void that has been left by the rejection of objective morality.  And one sign of this is that idea that we are all equally talented.  Let me explain. 

Of course, it is absolutely wrong to berate people.  Yet, what surely does not follow from this is that we should pretend that there are no differences between people in terms of abilities.  It is certainly silly to cancel sports games or to cast aside keeping score in the name of eliminating the idea of winners and losers. 

For one thing, the very idea of winning and losing is a wonderful metaphor for life itself, where we win some and we lose some.  The idea, of course, is to keep on playing the game.  So, there is an invaluable lesson of persistence that is learnt from the simple practice of games that involve winning and losing.  Likewise, there is the lesson that life goes on; and that what seemed at the moment like the end of everything was not that all.  These are, in fact, wonderful experiences to have. 

Finally, in this vein there is the idea of learning what we are good at doing; and nothing contributes more to that insight than actually doing things where there is the possibility for genuine success and failure.  This is because some things can be grasped only when they are experienced in real time, where there is the prospect of actual gains and losses. 

When morality was taken seriously, everyone understood that moral character was one thing and abilities regarding intellect and sports were another.  Thus, people had a vantage point from which to take themselves seriously that was independent from the abilities.  Religion, too, accomplished this.  And it is one of the very shortcomings on the part of Richard Dawkins that he gave this no thought at all.

The surprise, then, is that what may seem like none other than a relic of superstition is fundamentally important to us, simply because human beings need a way of affirming themselves that is fully independent of their abilities.  Accordingly, morality and love operated in tandem, with morality standing as a kind of public equivalent of the intimate. 

Precisely what we want is the theoretical machinery that undergirds the idea that differences in natural abilities do not make the difference in our humanity.  The idea that we all have the same abilities is none other than a lesson in frustration.  Moral objectivity has a much more fundamental place in our lives than we, with all of our cleverness, have been willing to acknowledge. 

t is very odd that a man who favors animal rights should also think that having sex with animals is morally acceptable.  Indeed, there is a very straightforward sense in which this seems awfully self-serving, in that trans-species equality turns out to be a way of increasing the array of sexual outlets for human beings.  Well, there is such a person; and he has a very distinguished career as an academician.  His name is Peter Singer and he is a professor at Princeton University.  There is a very real sense in which Peter Singer’s views regarding animal equality and inter-species sexual sex give universities a bad name; for his views seems to be woefully at odds with commonsense. 

Now, as a response Singer can rightly point out that once upon a time it was thought to flow from commonsense alone that marriage between members of different ethnicities was in some sense unnatural.  In fact, there are still people who think that.  There are black people who think that black people should only marry black people because this is natural; and there are white people who think that white people should only marry white people because this is natural.  

So Peter Singer can rightly say that so-called commonsense is hardly a measure of what we should or should not do.  While there may be something to this point, it really ought not to turn out that an argument for sexual intercourse between different ethnic groups also counts as an argument for sexual intercourse between humans and animals. 

Now, to begin with, there is a very profound reason why Singer’s argument for inter-species sex is most disturbing.  For if inter-species sex between a human being and a dog, say, is perfectly acceptable, then what exactly would count as the moral reason for not having sex between adults and infants?  If, as Singer notes, (i) a dog’s humping a human being’s leg might signal an opportunity for a sexual twist between a dog and a human being, then is he not also committed to the view that (ii) the sexual curiosity of a child might also be the occasion for a sexual twist between an adult and a child? 

The point here is that Peter Singer is so facile in putting forth (i) that he says nothing whatsoever to block (ii).  And that is a genuine problem. 

Let me be unequivocally clear: I do not think for a moment that (i) is at all morally acceptable.  The point, though, is that clearly (ii) is even less morally acceptable than (i).

What makes sex between and a dog and a human unacceptable?  Part of the answer seems to be that this is tantamount to a human using a dog in precisely the way that Singer thinks is objectionable.  When humans have sex with one another, their appreciation for one another both emotionally and physically is very much a part of what makes the sex so very satisfying.  It is because she knowingly touched him in the way that he likes.  And it is because he knowingly touched her in the way that she likes.  This quite simply is the phenomenon of sexual reciprocity.

Well, sexual reciprocity between a human being and a dog would seem to be downright impossible.  Even if we could make sense of the human being knowingly touching the dog in the way that the dog supposedly wants to be touched, what we cannot possibly do is suppose that the dog knowingly touches the human in the way that the human wants to be touched.  I mean what do dogs know about how human beings want to be touched?

And I would have thought that respect for animals, which Singer claims to be so very much about, would have entailed recognizing that human beings and animals are simply not capable of reciprocal sexual touching.  It would be none other than anthromorphizing to suppose that humans know what pleases an animal sexually.  For instance, it cannot be maintained that a dog’s humping a human leg is on the par with a man having an uncontrollable erection.  We have no way of knowing that. 

I, myself, find the idea of inter-species sex rather absurd—at least in the way that Singer means it.  Let me explain. 

Of course, we can imagine intelligent creatures whose intellectual and emotional skills mirror those of homo sapiens, yet these creatures are not at all homo sapiens.  Presumably, the Vulcans of the famed series Star Trek would satisfy this condition.  Obviously, sexual bonds between homo sapiens and Vulcans would be morally permissible; for both satisfy the condition of being rational creatures.  What clearly does not follow from this is that sexual bonds are thus morally permissible between human beings and all non-human creatures—cows, chickens, horses, and so on. 

This is a point of elementary logic, and so one that is well within Professor Singer’s reach.  From the truth that (a) it is morally permissible for human beings to have sexual relations with other rational creatures who are not in fact human beings—Vulcans, for example, what simply does not follow at all is that (b) it is morally permissible for human beings to have sexual relations with cows and dogs and so forth. 

As no doubt some have no read, the Parliament of Spain has granted rights to apes.  Mr. Singer favors this idea of trans-species equality.  But we may ask: what exactly is the equality here?  Will the apes defend our rights, just as we defend their rights? 

Part of the idea that all human beings have the same rights is that all human beings should be prepared to defend the rights of one another.  Well, it most certainly is not this conception of the equality of rights that is being extended to apes.  No one thinks for a moment that if apes see some measure of racism on the part of Asians against Arabs, then apes should be no less willing to step up to the moral plate and defend Arabs against Asians than Native Americans or Eskimos.  It is not even clear that we think that apes can recognize racism. 

More generally, there is nothing resembling a robust conception of moral responsibility that we are willing to apply to apes.  So while it may be true that apes have something resembling a sense of self, what is manifestly false is that this sense of self allows us to attribute moral responsibility to apes. 

Of course, Professor Singer is quite right that we should not harm apes.  His more robust view, however, is that apes are not to be treated as “mere things that can be owned and used for our amusement or entertainment”.  And this view is most problematic.  For is he claiming that owning an ape is morally analogous to the wrong of owning a human being, or close enough to that?  One would think that this line of thought requires a rather sustained argument; and Singer provides none.  It is in this regard that Mr. Singer’s position turns out to be most morally fulsome. 

It is one thing to say that apes should not be treated cruelly.  It is quite another to say that owning an ape is rather like owning a human being.  The evolutionary difference between a fully adult ape and a fully adult human being is considerable in just about every conceivable way.  Indeed, it is human beings who have the charge of protecting apes—and not the other way around.  This alone suggests a monumental moral difference between human beings and apes.  In fact, precisely that difference alone makes it manifestly clear that inter-species equality between human beings and apes is just so much nonsense.  The very character of the moral asymmetry between them insures the absence of moral equality between them.  Or so it is if what one means by moral equality that rights and duties apply equally to all. 

Now, once it is acknowledged that we have this kind of significance moral difference between apes and human beings, then we can ask whether or not the moral floor of decency is the same for both.  The answer might be affirmative.  However, we must show that it is affirmative while taking into account the moral differences between apes and human beings—and not by adopting the question-begging,  and utterly absurd, posture that they are on the exact same moral plane.  For that simply cannot be if adult human beings are morally responsible for protecting adults apes; whereas a like moral responsibility does not apply to adult apes when it comes to protecting adult human beings. 

Now to advocate sex between creatures who embody this level of moral difference in-kind between them is to defend what can only be called a most morally bankrupt form of sexual perversion at the expense of animals.  And this, surely, is moral equality that animals can very well do without. 

Laurence Thomas

he persistence of antisemitism in France is very frightening.  Particularly, disturbing is that antisemitism continues to express its in the form of sheer physical violence.  Muslims throughout the world have asked that non-Muslims accept and be comfortable with Muslim women wearing the hajib in public.  And that has indeed happened here in France.  A Muslim wearing the hajib is much more akin these days to a woman simply wearing a headscarf.  The hajib is adorned with flair throughout France—and not just in predominantly Muslim neighborhoods.  The sense of alarm on the part of non-Muslims, if ever there was one, has all but disappeared.  This holds for both Christians and Jews alike.

At this point in time, Jews in France simply hope that the day will come when they will be treated in a like manner when it comes to wearing a yarmulke.  That is, the hope is that a Jew walking down the street wearing a yarmulke will attract no more attention than a Muslim woman walking down the street wearing the hajib.  Not yet, however.  Saturday night (21 June 2008), a Jew named Rudy Haddad who was wearing a yarmulke was attacked by a group of people of North African descent.  And this sort of aggression against Jews has happened in the past.  The case of Halimi in 2006 is the most poignant of these.  By the way, does anyone think that these aggressors of North African descent were Christians or Hinduists? 

Nowadays, it is not uncommon for a person to make an assessment as to how well a Muslim woman’s hajib fits the rest of her attire.  Jews in France hope that one day, this is the only concern that a Jew wearing a yarmulke will have.  What happened to Rudy Haddad is painful reminder that in France this hope is yet to be realized. 

Of course, I understand that this sort of thing does not happen every day.  However, I do not recall ever hearing of a story where a Muslim woman wearing a hajib was attacked by Jewish women or, for that matter, Jewish men. 

I have spoken to a reality on the part of Muslims and a hope on the part of Jews.  And therein lies the problem of what I shall refer to as the public square of social justice in France. 

While the Jew and the Muslim are both equal before French law, there is another kind of equality with respect to which Muslims and Jews of France are not yet equal.  This is what I call the equality of the public square of social justice. 

I have an explanation for this disparity that may trouble some.  Yet, it needs to be said. 

The synagogue is a place of worship.  It is not an environment where Jews fuel hostilities towards Muslims.  Both in France and in the United States, I can think of very few times when a rabbi has had much to say about Muslims.  The synagogue is simply not a place for recruiting Jews to be subjected to anti-Muslim indoctrination. 

This could be purely a temporal matter.  For the Torah does not have anything at all to say about either Muslims or, for that matter, Christians.  In the Holy Quran, however, Jews are explicitly mentioned by their very name at least 21 times. 

This brings me to what is most important.  What we in fact know is that mosques have served as a very deep, deep source of antisemitism and that mosques have been used a recruiting ground for Muslims who will play a militant role in the demise of the Jewish people. 

Therein lies the source of the disparity between French Muslims and French in the public square of social justice.  There is a very powerful social institution, namely mosques, which continue to nurture antisemitism.  Synagogues do not nurture anti-Islam sentiment. 

Various social organizations have called upon the French government to concern itself with the recent hostilities against Jews in France. And to his credit, French President Nicolas Sarkozy has denounced the recent act of aggression.  If I am right, however, the problem lies not with the French government, but with a very different institution, namely mosques. 

Once upon a time, it was “fashionable” for Catholics to be antisemitic.  After all, everyone knew that “Those bastards, the Jews, had killed Christ”.  Nothing has made more of a difference in how Catholics think about Jews than the very fact that the Catholic Church enormously distanced itself from this point of view.  Indeed, Pope John Paul II referred to Jews as the “Elder brothers of Christians”.  Jews may still be unhappy with various aspects of the Catholic doctrine.  That said, what is absolutely undeniable is that the Catholic Church has changed mightily—and for the better—in its attitude towards Jews.

What we need is a like change on the part of Islam.  Let me be clear here.  I do not think for a moment that all Muslims are antisemitic.  But, of course, in order to have racial hostility on the part of a group, it does not need to be the case that each and every member of the group embraces that hostility. 

It is no longer a part of the public Catholic identity that blaming Jews for killing Christ is unacceptable.  What we need is for it to become a part of the public Muslim identity that hostility towards Jews is unacceptable.  Undoubtedly, there are some Muslims who think just that.  Unfortunately, there are sufficiently many who think just the opposite.  Accordingly, being hostile towards Jews remains a part of the public self-identity of Muslims taken as a group.  Or so it is in France and much of Europe. 

This, in the end, tells us what we all know, namely that justice at its best comes from the heart.  And religious institutions have played a most fundamental role in cultivating the sentiments of the heart, and so the sentiments that prevail in the public square of social justice.  By comparison to the United States, the number of Muslims in France is considerable, namely a fifth of the population.  Accordingly, until Islam accepts the moral responsibility changing the hearts of its adherent, there will never be true equality in the public square of social justice between the Muslim and the Jew—at least not in France and perhaps Europe more generally. 

It is, of course, important to call upon the government of France to concern itself with aggression of any kind.  However, there are no laws more potent and efficacious than those written upon the hearts of human beings.  And that, in the end, is France’s problem.  There has been a steadfast—nay, defiant—refusal on the part of so many leaders of Islam to change the hearts of its adherents to accept Jews as moral equals. 

In the attempt to exterminate the Jews, Hitler claimed to have been doing the work of the Lord.  Now, Imams and other Islamist claim to be doing the work of Allah in their endeavor to annihilate Jews.  There is no difference in what both claim to be dong.  Accordingly, it is not possible for Christian claims of this sort to be evil and Muslim claims of this sort to be morally acceptable.  We have refused to be unequivocally clear about this; and many in the Muslim world have masterfully exploited this ambivalence. 

In their relentless open-mindedness towards the Muslim religious tradition at its most hostile level, liberals have been none others than harbingers of evil. 

t some level all this talk about the marriage in France that was recently annulled because the woman lied about being a virgin is rather troubling.  As it turns out, the court will take up the issue again; and so for the moment the marriage has in fact been reinstated.  By the way, if the marriage was an arranged one, then what we may have is a “face-saving” attempt between them to annul the marriage—a marriage which neither the woman nor the man wanted.  I shall set this possibility aside, however.

Still, we need to be clear about why what has happened is so troubling, given the assumption that we do not have an arranged marriage.  As we shall see, things are troubling on two very different levels.  To begin with, though, if a woman has to lie about being a virgin, then one might very well argue that there is already a problem with the man whom she wants to marry.  Why?  Because this is to say that for him, the woman’s virginity is a more decisive factor than her moral character; and that is absurd.  I can only suppose that the man was attracted to the woman, in the first place, because of her moral character; and that did not change upon the discovery that she is not a virgin. 

This does not excusing her deceiving him.  For that was wrong and nothing changes that fact.

There still the issue of his insistence upon virginity; and we shall see this is in fact a serious problem. 

Noqw, do not misunderstand me.  If this is what a man wants to insist upon, then so be it.  People insist upon all sorts of indefensible things.  But when we inexorably insist upon something, we should be able to give a rather illuminating answer to the question: To what end are we holding out unfailingly for the thing in question?  And when the thing upon which we insist is entirely unrelated to excellence, then that is a problem. 

Now, it is not just the man’s insistence upon his wife’s virginity that concerns me.  I have continually wondered about the woman, too.  I mean if the man she wants to marry is that inflexibly tied to tradition that he cannot look pass it to apprehend the depth of her character, then my very first thought is that we have a bad match before we even get started.  That is, she should have thought him way too uncompromising about the wrong issue.  So her willingness to lie reveals just how warped she was, given that she knew the importance that he attached to the issue.  There was no reason whatsoever to think that he was going to have a change of heart on their wedding night.  So this was the wrong man for her. 

If there is perhaps a correlation between excellence of moral character and virginity, it is not a very strong one.  In particular, what is surely not the case is that the mere absence of virginity entails that someone has what is called a loose moral character.  So it is whether we are talking about the man or the female.  In the typical case: A woman would be a fool to marry a 30 year old male who has slept around with 30 women—and for exactly the same reasons that a man would be a fool to marry a 30 year old woman who has slept around with 30 men.  While reasonable people can differ over how many sexual partners before make a person an unsafe bet for a marital partner, this much clear: The correct answer is certainly not 1.  Hence, it follows as a matter of logic that the absence of virginity does not in and of itself warrant a negative assessment of a person’s moral character in terms of being good spouse or a good parent.  That would be rather like supposing that if a person had been once inebriated, then we might as well say that the individual is an alcoholic. 

But the recent issue in France very much speaks to a larger issue.  This is because hymnoplasty is becoming very serious business among Muslims in Europe.  But what is hymnoplasty?  It is a way of putting the hymen back in place.  Muslim women who are seeking the surgery are those who have lost their virginity and who wish to hide this fact in order to secure a Muslim marriage with a Muslim man. 

So, between (1) the woman who is simply honest that she is not a virgin and (2) the woman who has hymnoplasty in order to hide the fact that she is not a virgin: Who is the better woman?  There can be no question but the first woman is very much the better woman (other things equal).  And any Muslim man who is so fixated with virginity that he would rather have a woman who lives a foundational lie throughout their entire marriage to one who is honest with him from the very outset (or when appropriate after the relationship has developed) is a Muslim man who has an improper fixation with both virginity and an aspect of Muslim tradition.  He is a man who is more interested in the image than the reality.  And that is a problem for any marriage, no matter what the religious tradition or lack thereof. 

It is worth pointing out that everything I have said is perfectly compatible with holding virginity until marriage as an ideal.  But what should be our response be when an ideal is not met?  Well, that depends on a lot of things.  And what seems manifestly clear is that it is a mistake to be so unshakably tied to an ideal that one will accept nothing else—especially when a single act suffices to make it the case that one has missed the mark and enormous excellence of character thereinafter is completely ignored. 

After all, there are ideals for a good husband as well.  And I suspect that most Muslim men miss the mark on numerous occasions.  There is no single litmus test analogous to the absence of virginity that makes a Muslim man an unacceptable husband.  And in this sense, women are right to point out that the initial annulment is offensive to women. 

Marriage is a profound commitment between two people.  Both should bring moral excellence to the occasion.  And if failing a virginity test, when in point of fact virginity is quite independent of excellence of character, can make a woman unfit to be a bride, then there ought to be similar test for a man the failure of which reveals the man unfit to be a groom. That is fairness. 

A final comment: All three monotheistic religious traditions place a value upon virginity.  Judaism and Christianity allow for repentance with respect to sex outside of marriage.  And surely that is how it should be.  Whatever else is true, insofar as sex outside of marriage is wrong it is not a wrong that in and of itself taints a person’s character forever.  And any religious tradition that would in effect make that claim about a woman who is not a virgin is simply misguided.  This follows even if one supposes that in the matter of sex women should be more circumspect than men. 

Thus, to the extent that Muslim men are playing the virginity card, then men are wronging the very people, namely Muslim women, whose purity they deem so important.  Muslim men are doing this by making the utterly indefensible move of fixing upon the presence of a single bodily part as a sign of moral excellence in character. 

Indeed, in their insistence on virginity, Muslim men are making things worse for both Muslim women and men alike.  Here is why.  Because hymnoplasty now makes it possible for Muslim women to live a lie, then the Muslim male insistence upon female virginity is contributing to the desecration of the very institution that both should regard as sacred; for the lie has been made more important the sacredness of the marriage and the commitment of the wife and husband to one another.  Not a good start.  Absolutely not.  For it has already been conceded that the lie and the image are more important than the reality of truth. 

here is very real sense in which those who argue for eliminating all differences between the sexes need to answer a very important question, namely: What reason is there to take heterosexuality seriously in the first place?  There is a rather thought-provoking article in the New York Times entitled “When Mom and Dad Share It All”.  This wife and husband, and mom and dad, do everything 50-50.  The two of them are absolutely determined not to allow any gender bias to get in the way.

Of course, a question that arises at the outset is: What counts as a gender bias?  Interestingly, the argument cannot be that we have a gender bias just in case the bias can be overcome with apt socialization.  This is because a disposition or a pre-disposition is not non-biological merely because it can be overcome by socialization.  For instance, it is known that a child can be born with a genetic pre-disposition towards violence or towards alcohol consumption.  Yet, these dispositions can be overcome through adequate self-discipline.  Arguably, certain fears that are rather natural to human beings have enormous survival value.  Still, these fears can be overcome through sheer dent of will. 

Now, are women and men exactly alike when it comes to their biological children?  From a purely evolutionary standpoint, it would be a phenomenal mistake if they were.  This follows from what is known as parental investment theory (developed by Robert L. Trivers).  In bringing a child into the world, a woman invests quite a bit more than a man.  Accordingly, there is a difference between women and men in terms of attachment to children.  The point here is that in terms of child attachment, we can get a difference between women and men that is not all about mere socialization, as some feminists would have it.

There is no question at all, however, that this difference between women and men can be socialized away. And perhaps it should.  On the one hand, it is certainly true that from the fact that something has a biological basis, what surely does not follow is that we should hold onto that something.  On the other, though, what is equally true is that from the fact that we can socialize a biologically based difference away it most certainly does not follow that we should. 

What intrigues me regarding many feminist arguments is that they seem to entail that we should socialize away all biological differences between women and men—at least when it comes to feelings and sentiments. 

And my question is a very simple one: Can we socialize away all biological differences between women and men while, at the same time, continuing to valorize heterosexuality?  That strikes me as extremely difficult to do.  After all, the differences between women and men are at the very basis of heterosexual attraction.  There is, for instance, that cute little way in which a woman can pout; and I have no desire to see a man behave in that way.  And I am rather sure that there is not a heterosexual man on the planet who would disagree with me.  Again, that coy look of sexual admiration on the part of a woman makes any man feel like a man in ways that words cannot describe.  Yet, again, there is not a heterosexual man in the world who is equally moved by such a look from another man.

Sexual arousal between heterosexuals is inextricably tied to women and men acting in different ways and having different sensibilities.  So I do not see how to socialize away these differences and, at the same time, valorize heterosexuality itself. 

What particularly astounds me is why feminism has not followed the idea of ethnic equality.  No one, nowadays, thinks that ethnic equality means that all ethnic groups must behave in exactly the same way.  Quite the contrary, the very idea seems to be that ethnic equality valorizes the differences between ethnicities rather seeks to eliminate them, precisely because the differences make for a much richer world. 

If there is anything we know, we know that ethnic differences can only be explained by way of acculturation.  There is nothing biological about any of it, although it is astounding how firm things become in such a short period of time.  Accent is an excellent example.  The point, though, is that in the case of ethnic differences we take acculturation and valorizes them mightily. 

By contrast, when it comes to difference between women and men, there is a rush to insist that any difference between the two has to be none other than socialization from which it is then supposed to follow that the only just thing to do is get rid of those differences.  But that cannot be quite right, given what we do with ethnic differences—differences which, by hypothesis, are known to have none other than socialization at their very source.

The article, “When Mom and Dad Share It All”, points to equality among homosexual couples as something of an ideal.  And in a different New York Times article, “Gay Unions Shed Light on Gender in Marriage”, the suggestion again is that the difference between women and men is none other than socialization.  This is a fascinating claim given that it is claimed by many that there is a gene for homosexuality.  So it is claimed that there is gene for a way of being that few claim to have any survival value.  This is embraced by all sorts of people.  Yet, the very idea of genetic differences that would differentiate between the way in which women and men behave is dismissed as so much nonsense. 

We accept—nay, relish—a multitude of differences.  Yet, we seem to be determined to banish the differences that are most central from an evolutionary perspective.  To what end are these efforts?  Alas, this is far from clear.  And therein lies the problem for me.  No one doubts for a moment that there has been sexism in the world.  What hardly follows from this truth is that all differences between women and men should be eliminated.  Nor, again, does it follow that we need to eliminate all difference between them in order to have genuine equality between women and men. 

It may very well be true that for some married people it is a good thing that everything is 50-50.  However, there is no reason on the face of this earth to suppose that such an arrangement should be held up as an ideal, any more than it shoudl be held up as an ideal that all ethnic groups should act in the same way. 

he French are quite excited about the idea of Barack Obama becoming president of the United States.  As I shall argue, the excitement strikes me as quite disconcerting.  Of course, it does not bother me at all that anyone has a view about who would be a good president for the United States.  I welcome any and all insights about the matter.  The French, however, are advancing a line of argument that is, I believe, profoundly haunting.  It goes like this: If Obama should become president of the United States what a sign it would be that America has finally transcended its history of racism of which black slavery is the very embodiment. 

.The point sounds innocuous enough until one remembers that France, itself, has hardly been free of racism.  Indeed, there has never been a non-white president of France.  In fact the same holds for the countries of Western Europe.

To be sure, racism in France is configured rather differently from racism in the United States.  And it is, of course, true that black slavery as it existed in the United States has never existed upon the soil of France.  But the issue of skin color most certainly is not a non-issue in France. 

The people of France can be rightly proud of the fact there has never been slavery upon its soil.  But what simply does not follow from this truth is that racism involving blacks has not been a very serious problem in France.  Let me offer an example that seems to have escaped many of my friends in France. 

Although French cafés are everywhere to be found, what is striking is that there are very few blacks who are waiters.  Most are white and they range across every conceivable age and social background.  Well, not quite: Thus far, I have never really encountered a well-to-do waiter in a French café.  In any case, the point here is that there is nothing about what café waiters in France are like in terms of education or background that would explain why black waiters are a rarity. 

France is a culture of politeness.  So its racism has never had any the brutality and viciousness that was characteristic of racism in the United States.  Yet, skin color has very much mattered.  Indeed, one of the comedy sketches that appears on the radio program Rire et Chansons plays upon just that reality.   

Notwithstanding slavery in the United States, blacks have made unparalleled progress vis à vis other countries.  For instance, one would be hard pressed to visit regularly any major bank in any major American city and not find a black teller here and there—especially if one did so for more than a decade.  Yet, during precisely this time period I have seen only one black employee of my bank, which is located in the very heart of Paris.  And that black teller is now gone. 

Enough of these petty reflections, though.  Let me ask a more pointed question: Has France ever had a black in public office of the stature of Condoleezza Rice or Colin Powell?  An Arab or an Asian?  Well, this question must be answered negatively. 

So when I hear French people telling me that Obama would mark the beginning of a new era for the United States were he to become president, I ask myself: What about a new era for France?  If a black face as president of the United States would signal such a turning point for the United States, then surely a black face as president of France would be equally significant.  Perhaps it would be all the more significant.

But wait a minute: If the far more racist country is the Untied States rather than France, as so many in France would have me believe, then what exactly is the explanation for why there has not been a black president of France or an Arabic president of France?  I mean why has France not even had the equivalent of a Powell or a Rice? 

Supposed I criticized you for being 100 pounds overweight and exclaim that you need to go on a diet.  Alas, it turns out that I am 70 pounds overweight.  Well, my being overweight does not change the fact that you need to go on a diet.  But the problem is that I need to heed my very own words; and something is terribly wrong if I miss that. 

Well, it seems to me that the French in their enthusiasm for Obama are failing to see that their point about the significance of Obama being a black man leading the United States applies with equal force to France.  A black or Arabic president of France would also signal that On a vraiment tourné la page ici en France.