e often ask ourselves: Why do people commit evil behavior?  I am referring here not to “small” wrongs such as the theft of an apple or a robbery where the victim is in no way physically harmed.  I am thinking of what we generally refer to as heinous moral wrongs.  A most salient example would be soldiers who rape the women of a village.  For one thing, it seems next to impossible to commit an act of rape and not realize that one is causing the victim great anguish.  For another, no soldier who commits such an act thinks even for a moment that such a thing should be done to the women of his town.  So how can it be that soldiers do what is so heinously wrong on just about every conceivable account?  If I can explain this, then there is much egregious immoral behavior that I can explain. 

I believe that the answer regarding soldiers has to do with the importance of fitting-in; and this is significant because fitting-in tends to contribute to our psychological well-being.  Among other things, it gives us a sense of belonging; and that is not trivial to our psychological well-being.

The soldier case seems stunning until one remembers that for most men not being perceived as homosexual is of the utmost importance.  Men do all sorts of things in order to make sure that there is next to no chance that anyone will entertain that thought about them.  It is easy to miss this reality on college campuses where being gay is to some extent valorized.  In the real world, nothing of the sort is true.  Instead, being gay is at best tolerated.  We are all for gay people just so long as everyone knows that we, naturally, are straight. 

Sexual orientation is not like ethnicity, for instance, where people are often willing to withhold judgment until they know more about the person.  No, the presumption of heterosexuality is in place from the outset except in very rare circumstances.  The assumption of heterosexuality is a fundamental aspect of the soldier mindset.  One can no doubt see where this argument is going. 

All human beings are self-monitors; though, to be sure, some are much better at this than others.  Thus, with rare exception we know whether or not our behavior fits in with the on-going norms regarding this or that group.  If John wears a coat and tie, he does not think for a moment that he should be seen as dressing like a “thug”.  By contrast, if John wears his pants halfway down his ass in typical “thug” style, it will not come as any surprise to him that no thinks that he is off to perform altar-boy service.

On the battlefield, few things are more important than fitting-in; and among male soldiers heterosexuality is one of the defining aspects of fitting-in.  Accordingly, any and every male soldier tends to be very, very, very concerned that his behavior underscores the social reality that he is heterosexual.  To this, we need only add that the bond here plays a most important role in the psychological well-being of soldiers under circumstances of extreme duress.

In the context of war, it is better that soldiers come off as men—namely heterosexuals—than that they take the higher moral ground, where doing so leaves their heterosexuality very much open to question.  This mindset will get us easily enough to the rape behavior that we see in war, and which we rightly find ever so appalling. 

Think of a group of soldiers on the battlefield as a closed community.  In that context, fitting-in is of the utmost importance.  Accordingly, it takes very little to raise doubts about whether a person fits in or not. It is this reality that makes the issue of heterosexuality an easy target.  One is already in the business of killing the enemy.  From that standpoint, raping enemy women does not obviously count as a much worse moral wrong.  And to this all one needs to add is that the sex with woman is a way of affirming heterosexuality.  This creates a combustible moment of immorality. 

Of course, we know that rape should not ever be a means of affirming masculinity.  But a moral argument of this sort among heterosexual men in the throes of war is not apt to have the salience that it has among philosophers evaluating arguments and behavior in the context of their very affirming office, where it very difficult to make sexual orientation an issue. 

To the above considerations, we need only add the following.  Most of us deal with not fitting-in one context if it is the case that we have considerable moral standing in another context and, moreover, we are able to invoke that context to some degree or the other.  Precisely what is missing with soldiers on the battlefield is another context in which they can have moral standing vis-à-vis their fellow soldiers.  Thus, it is in fact makes it easier to go along with the obnoxious rape behavior or at least not to report it, then to take a moral stand against it.  For if nothing else, going along with the obnoxious rape behavior insures that their unity with their fellow soldiers remains intact.  And if anything is important on the battlefield, unity with one’s fellow soldiers is.  Doing anything to destroy that unity would be foolish. 

Or, to put the point a different way:  When one is on the battlefield, what most certainly is true is that destroying the unity that one has with one’s fellow soldiers requires more courage than most of us have. 

There are contexts in which sexual orientation is invariably a particularly salient matter.  For the moment, at least, war is one of those contexts.  Indeed, it is a context where some of the deepest bonds possible are forged between males but entirely without any possibility of sexual overtones.  Or so it is hoped.  This very strength from the standpoint of being effective soldiers makes for a very serious moral liability.